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Chapter3
TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

I. CLIENT CONFLICTS
Circular 230 §§ 10.20 and 10.29
Tax Court Rule 2'4(g) (Appendix G)
Model Rules 1.7, 1.81 1.9 and 1.13(a)
AICPA ET § 102.03 and Interpretation 102-2 (Appendix H)
A. Introduction
The point of conflicts of interest rules is to protect clients' reasonable expectations that'leg/u advisors and representatives will act on their behalf free
from compromising loyalties and influences. Thus, the basic prilli:ip_le embodieil'in'the Model Rules' conflict provisions is that a lawyer may not represent
anyone where the interests of ahother person - a current or former client,
perhaps, or the lawyer's oWn interests - could impair the lawyer's ability to
zealously and impartially act on a client's belialf. Resolution of a conflict might
entail declining to undertake representation, withdrawing from an existing
representation, or obtaining a Client or clients' written consent to proceed
despite a conflict.
The basic rules governi:tig conflicts of interest are contained in Model Rule
1.7. This rule sets out the general conflicts of interest principles on which all
other conflicts rules rely. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides that a lawyer may not
represent a client if that representation involves a concurrent conflict, meaning
that either:
1. the representation of one client will be directly adverse to l)llother client, or
2. there is a significant risk that representation of one or ntore clients will
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility to another client, a
• former client, or a third person, or by the lawyer's own personal
interest.
Notwithstanding a concurrent conflict, however, Model Rule 1. 7(b) permits a
lawyer to represent a client if:
1. the lawyer believes that she will be able to .competently and diligently
represent each affected client,
2. the representation is not pro!rlbited by law,
3. the representation does not involve the assertion of a clai:tn by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
other proceeding,. and
4. each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
AI CPA confllcts of int~rest rules are set forth at AI CPA C~de of Professional
Con,<;Iuct ET Section 102.03 and Interpretation 102--2, which are reproduced
;tt App.endix H. Conflicts of interest for accountants are defined in terms of
69
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relationsJ:Ups that could be viewed by a client, employjlr,, or another pp.rty as
impairing a'CP.Ns objectivity. If a CPA believes that a professional service can
be performed with objectivity, however, and the relationship is disclosed to and
consent is obtained from the client, employer, or other appropriate party, then
the CPA is permitted to perform the professional service. Conflicts cannot be
waived with respect to engagements that require independence, e.g., audits,
1
reviews and other attest services.

B. Differences Among the Guiging Principles
The conflicts of interest rules in Circular 230 § 10.29 are very stmilar to
those in Model Rule 1.7. Circular 230 § 10:29, however, imposes three additional
requirements. First, while both the Model Rules and Circular 230 require that
conflict waivers be confirmed in writing, Circular 230 mandates that confirmation qe obtained within a reasonable period of time, but in no event later than
39 ,llays after the client has consen~d to the repr~sentation. (The A!CPA standards do nqt require written conse.nt,.) Second, unlike Model Rule 1.7, w)lj.'ch
permits atiected plient~ to provide in'formed consent verbally if the consent is
contemporaneously do~~mented by the practitioner in ~tlng, ~ Vflt.bal con?ent followed by a confi\'II,Iatory letter authored by the practitioner will not
satiszy Circu,lar 23q ~ 10.29 l,Ulless ~he confirma~ory letter is countersig.ned by
th!j client. Finally, under qrcular 230, practitioners are required to retai.J;l. cop.ies of written consents for at least 36 months from the date on which representation of the client concludes.
' .,
Practitioners must provide copies of written consents to IRS officers or
employees, including tl}ose from OPR, upon request. Al,th9ugh the requp-ement
to turn over copies of written consents is explicitly stated in Circular 230 §
10.29(c), it is consistent with the practitioner's duj;y, as a 11eneral matter \liider
Circular 230 § 10.20, to provide documents and information to tlie IRS upo}\
proper and lawful request. Unlike Circular 230 § 10.29(c), however, Circular
230 § 10.20 explicitly-provides that information· and documentS' need not be
turned over if the practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds
that the records or information are privileged. Perhaps the very •fact that
Circular 230 § 10.29 requires that writtEl.ll consents be obtained and held for
36 months should the IRS or OPR request them is meant to negate-privilege as
to such written con~ents because there could be no realistic expectation of privacy. 'Of coul:se, this· argt.iment presumes that the client vfiderstands at the
time of signing that the consent must be turned over by the practitioner to the
IRS upon request. It is ,the.client's expectation of privacy, and notthe attorney
or tax adviser's, that matters for privilege purposes.
Alternatively, it is possible that OPR regards written consents as inl)ligible
for protection by the attorney-client or Section ·.!75!25 privilege in the first
instance, Such a position• may often_be>incorrect, parti<!ularly if a written consent document includes or reflects privileged communications. Therefore, where
a practitioner chooses to explain the n'iture of a conflict 1tQ,her P.lient i.J;l writing,
it would be prudent to have the client consent, or confirm consent, in a separate
docu\}lent, which could be turne~ over to tHe IRS or'bPR'without w,_o.zy, It is
generally understood that OPR' considers failure to retain' or turp. over a'v¢tten consent a violalion 'Of Circular 230 regardless of the quality of the uhderlying representation.
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Practitioners representing clients in Tax Court proceedings must comply
with the Tax Court's OWI).,rule on conflicts of interest:' Tax Court Rule 24(g)
provides that if any counsel of record "represents more than one person with
differing interests with respect to any issue in the case," she mus~ secure the
clients' informed consent to the representation, Withdraw from the case, or
1<.lke whatever other s,j;eps ~re necessary to obvia~e the conflict of interest. Tax
Court Rule 24(g) imposes the same obligatiqns on any 1xlimsel who "was
involved in plannil)-g or prompting a transaction or operating an entity that is
connected to any fssue in a case." Counsel who is a potential witness in a case
must withdraw or take other steps necessary to obii.ate a conflict; obtaining
the client's lnformeq consent is not an option in this situf!tion.
·PROBLEM 3-1

X is the president and' chlef executive officer of Family-Run Corp., a small,
family-run busines's. Family-Run engages Practitioner to prepare tax returns
(dr 'the compSI!-Y, its officers and its shareholders (all family members). As
Practitioner prepares Family-Run's return, there is a question as to whether a
payment the company made tO X is a deductible payment of compensation or a
nondeductible return of capital. Does Practitioner have a conflict of interest? If
so, can it be Cl\red, and how?
PROBLEM3-2
'

Q, A !!I'd B, all individuals, are partners in LP, a limited partnership. Q is the
general partner. Q engages Practitioner to. prepare LP's return (Form ~065)
and the partners' Schedules K-1. Practitioner is separately engaged by Q, A
and B to prepare 'their individual income tax returns. While preparing LP's
return; Practitioner identifies an issue as to' the meaning of a provision in the
partnership agreement that will affect the allocation of partnership' iteins to
the partners. This provision could be interpreted to provide an allocation 'of.
certain tax benefits to Q, to the detriment of A and B. Does Practitioner have a
conflict of interest? If so, can it be cured, and how?

PROBLEM3-3

Jon and Kate were married for all of 2009. In June 2009, Kate· initiated
divorce proceedings. In early 2010, Jon engages Practitioner to prepare the
couple's joint tax return for 2009. Not long after, Kate (through her attorney)
asks Practitioner to prepare her 2009 tax return as married filing separately.
When Practitioner informs Kate's attorney that he was already engaged by Jon
to prepare a joint return for the couple, the attorney informs Practitioner that
Kate has no intention of signing a joint tatum. Does Practitioner have a conflict of interest? If so, can it be cured, and how?

1
Practitioners representing clients in Tax Court must comply with all of the Model Rules, which
have been adopted as rules of practice before the court. Tax Court Rule 201(a). Differences between

the Model Rules and the rules adopted by one's own state of admission or practice, therefore,
should be carefully monitored.

CH.3

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

72

C. Business Planning
~.

•

•

'

~

• j'

,Most Corporate Tax classes begm w1th a study p( the tax con~.equences pf
corp'orate formation, "Section 35l exchanges." Inevitably, students are asked\6
consider a hy~)Qthe'tical Sflt of facts involving· several '!Pl'elated persons who,
together, desire to jncorporate a new entity, wit~ !'ach l?erson transferring previously-owned property, cash and/or service's to t'be ne~l.Y-formed entity in
exchange for stock and, perhap~, other property ("bo9t"j., Students are routi,hely
asked to consider whether each tranSferor recogni!'es ll'aii'ibf loss, and 'Yliat
each transferor's basis in her newly acquired stock and bopt will be. On thE\
corporate side, students learn that the ,corppration itse)f rec,9!hllzes no gain or
loss on the issuance of shares, and master the increasingly complicated rules
governing a corporation's basis in property received from transferors. Professors
go to great lengths to assist students in div4ling those situations in which nonrecognition is a benefit .a,nq those in which it is not. Students ~ainstortl! solutions to assist the various ptayers in, e.g., recognizing losses but not gains,
prese.rving or protecting. unre~ognized losses, and maximizip.g corpo~ate p.asi":
in depreciable ~sets. Corresponding.concepts are covered in Partners"\rlp Tax
classes in. connection with formation of J?arlnerships and limited Jial)ility
companies. ,
What typically is omitted from such instruction, however,.is·an examination
of the ethical situation in which an attorney hired by all of the transferors finds
herself. While individuals entering into a new business venture might view
their interests as common, that is not necessarily so. Particularly in the case of
s1p.all businesses founded by individuals, one a~torney is oft~n hired by the
entire group to handle the c'orpbr~:e formation.
'• ~fa lawyer agree~ to accept representation,· who is the client, th~ indivi<lu.al
transferqrs (separately or as a group) or the c01;poral;\on that results fr9m the
represent11-tion? Does the answer depend upon whether the attorney will
aontinue to work professionally with the corporation?

State Bar of Arizona Opinion No. 02-06
(Sept. 2002)'
Summary
A lllwyer may form a bu13iness entity for various individuals and bef' counsel
only for tlie yet-to-be-formed entity, if appropriate disclosures and consents
occur. Alternatiyllly, a lawyer may represent all of the incorporators,' collectively, with approprtate disclosures.
"

'

•

I

~

~

F.acts
Lawyer is a business law practitio'ner who currently represents several businessmen in various matters. The existing clients ask the lawyer to form a new
entity corporation for them and to be counsel only for the entity.

•

' Copyright © 2002. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of the State Bar of Arizona.
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Questions Presented

i.

May a lawyer represent a yet-to-be-forined entity during formation?
2. Can a lawyer rep,resent the prospective entity without being deemed to
also represent the incm;porators?
• "
'
1
3. If so, what disclosures must the lawyer make to the constituents to clarifY
. who is the client?

***

l

f

Opinion

1. Can a lawyer represent an entity that does not yet exist?
Yes, as long as the incorporators understand that they are retaining counsel
on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed entity and will need to ratify this corporate
action, nunc pro tunc, once the entity is formed. According to [Rule] J..13(a), a
lawyer may represent an "organization." The Comments to the Rule explain
that an "organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through
its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents.... The
duties defined in this comment apply equally to unincorporated associations."
An "organizational client" or "entity'' can be a separate client. For purposes
of the ethical analysis, this Opinion will refer to "corporations" as the entity at
issue, but the analysis also is applicable to other legal entities.
''
, To determine whether a lawyer ethically may represent a yet-to-be-formed
corporation, the analysis ,must include a review of Arizona corporate and partnership statutes. A.R.S. § 10-203 provides:
A. Unless a delayed effective date is specified ·in the articles of incorporation, incorporation occurs and the corporate existence begins' when the
articles of incorporation and certificate of disclosure are delivered to• the
commission for filing.
'
Under this statute, a corporation does not exist as a separate legal entity until
its articles of incorporation are filed with the Corporation Commission. 3 Section
10-204 of the Arizona Revised Statutes further cautions that indiviuuals who
attempt to transact business as a corporation, knowing that no corpotatil!n
exists, will be jointly liable for their actions. Presumably, however, ·a newly formed
corporation may ratifY pre-incorporation acts of the corporation, nunc pro tunc!

·' .

A decision f)-om Wisconsin specifically holds that a lawyer hired to form ;m
entity can represent the to-be-formed entity, not the incorporators, and t):le
"entity'' rule applies retroactively. Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1992).
This view would be consistent with the "entity" theory of representation, under
[Rule] 1.13(a). The "entity" theory holds that a lawyer may represent the corporation and does not, necessarily, represent any of the constituents that act on
behalf of the entity- even ifitis a closely held corporation. See, e.g., Skarbrevik
v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, ·282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. App. 1991); Bowen
v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186,(Wyo. 1992).

3

[1] Partnerships, however, are not required to make a filing to establish their existence; a partnership exists once there is an "association of two or more persons to carry on as co..owners [of] a
h\lBiness for profit... whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership,» A.R.S. § 29-1012.A.
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An alternative view is the "aggregate" theory in which the lawyer is fuund to
represent, the incorporators/~onsti~u.ents. collectively as joint t;qents. See Griva v.
Davison, 637 A.2d 83Q (D.C. 1994). Under the aggreg~te.theo'i,}\ a lawyer represents multiple co-clients during formation of the corporation lmd then oiiee the
entity is formed, the clients must determine whether 'the law)'er will continue to
represent all of the co'rlstitueiits arid the ·entity, or just the entity. Who a lawyer
may represent depends upon whether the lawyer's independent professiorlrujudgment would be materially limited because of the lawyer's duties to another client
or third person. See [Rule]1.7(b); Matter of Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 876 P.2d 548
(1994). As discussed below in Section 3, there are specific disclosures that a lawyer
must make to co-clients, in order for them to consent to a joint representation.
. Thus,_a lawyer may represent an entity during the formation process, as
long as the constituents who are acting on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed entity
understan,d. and agree to the entity being the client.
2. Can a lawyer represent only the yet-j;o-be-formed,,entity and not the
con~tituents?

Who a: lawyer represents depends upon the reasonable perceptions of those
have consulted with the lawyer. In re Petrie, 154 Ariz. 295 (1987). When
two or more indhjduals consult with a lawyer apout forming an entity, it is the
responsibility of the lawyer at that h\itial me(jting to clarify who the lawyer
will represent. [Rule] 1.13 provides that a lawyer may represent an entity and
the Rule suggests that the lawyer will not automatically be considered counsel
for the constituents because paragraph (e) of the Rule provides:
~ho

A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees"m~bers, shareholders or other constituents, subject
to the provisions of.[Ruleh1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation js .required by [Rule] 1. 7, the, consent shall be given by an :;~ppropri
ate official ofthe organization other than the individual who is to be represented,
9r by the shareholders.
l

•

, In Samaritan v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 508, 862 P.2d 870 (1993), the Arizona
Supreme Court confirmed that a lawyer representing an entity does not automatipi!lly represent the constituents. Therefore, unless a lawyer wants to be
~oun§.el,to all of the incorporators and the entity, the lawyer shQuld specify that
the lawyer does '\ot represent, the constituents,colle<;tively·- the lawyer only
represents the entity. If an engagement letter or oral rl'presentation by the
lmvY'er suggests that'the constituents are represented' as an aggregate, then
the lawyer will have ethical obligations to each constituent. Aggregate representation also is ethically proper if the disclosure to each client include's
an ·eicplanation that the lawyer may have to withdraw from representing each
clieht'if a conflict arises among the clients.
:'

'

3. What disclosures should a lawyer make to the incorporating constituents to
obtail'l:their informed consent to the limited r!lpresentation of the entity?
The underlying premise of the conflict Rules is loyalty to cliimts. Where a
lawyer's independent professional judgment for a client is materially limited
due to anything or anyone, a conflict may exist. Thns, in order to avoid inadvertent conflicts caused by misunderstandings of constituents in corporate representations, it is crucial for lawyers to specifY exactly who they represent, who
they do not represent, and how informatiori'·conveyed to the lawyer by

I.
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constituents of an entity client will be treated, for confidentiality purposes.•The
Restatement Third, The Law Governing Lawyers, Comment b to § 14 provides
in part: "A lawyer may ,be held to responsibility of representation when the
client reasonably relies on the existence of the relationship ...."
See also Comment f: "LA] lawyer's failure to clarify whom the lawyer represents in circumstances calling for such a result might lead a lawyer to have
entered into client-lawyer representations not intended by the lawyer."
Therefore, it is crucial that a lawyer specify in the 'lngagement agreement if
the lawyer is not representing the constituents of an entity client.
Even if the engagement letter specifies that the constituents are not clients,
lawyers still should regularly caution constituents that they are not clientsparticularly when they consult with counsel. Lawyers who represent entities
also must be aware oftJ:vl entity's potential fiduciary duties to the constituents,
so that the lawyer does not run afoul ofthose statutory or common law obligations. For instance, there are cases that have held that lawyers may have fiduciary duties to non-clients, depending upon whether the entity represented had
fiduciary duties to the third parties. See Fickett v. Superior Ct. of Pima Cty, 27
Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976); Matter of Estate of Shano, 177 Ariz. 550,
869 P.2d 1203 (App. 1993) (lawyer disqualified as counsel to administrator for
an estate Mcause of•prior representation of one beneficiary and derivative duty
of neutrality to all beneficiaries). Accordingly, lawyers for entities should be
mindftil of this potential responsibility and that a derivative fiduciary duty to
constituents may cause a conflict of interest for the lawyer.
The engagement letter also should explain that once the entity is 'created,
the constituents agree to ratify the lawyer's services, nunc pro tunc on behalf
of the entity.
With respect to confidentiality obligations, lawyers should specify how information conveyed to the lawyer will be treated for confidentiality purposes. If
the firm is representing only the entity, constituents must be advised that their
communications to the lawyer will be conveyed to the other decision-makers
for the entity and are not conlj.dential as to the entity. The informatipn is confidential, however, according to Rule 1.6(a), to the "outside world." Similarly,
information shared by one co-client that is necessary for the representation of
the other joint clients will be shared with the other co-clients because there is
no individual confidentiality when a joint representation exists.
Finally, if the laWYer has chosen to represeot multiple clients, including the
constituents and the entity,.the lawyer should explaio, at the beginning of the joint
representation, that :in the event that a conflict arises among the clients, the lawyer most likely will need to withdraw from representing all of the co-clients.
However, some commentators, including the Restatement Third, note that the
engagement agreement may provide that in the event of a conflict, the lawyer may
withdraw from representing one of the co-clieots and continue to represent the
remaining clients. The usefulness of such provisions was recently demonstrated in
In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation v. Grass, 139 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Pa.
April17, 2001), where the court permittl'd the law firm to withdraw as counsel for
one of the executives of Rite Aid and continue as counsel for the eotity in a class
action suit, primarily because the engagel)lent agreement provided fon such action.
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In Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1992), a case referred to in the
State Bar of.Arizona opinion, supra, ihe Wisconsin Supreme Court held·that
the client is the corporation, not the corperation's constituents. This is referred
to as "the entity theocy." The court stated:

We thus provide the following guideline:•where (1) a person :~:etains alawyer for the purpose of organizing an entity.·and (2) the lawyer's
involvement with that person is directly related to .that incorpdration
, ap.d (3~ such entjty is eventually incorporated, the entity.rule applies
retroactively such, that the la~er's pre-incm•pora~ion involvement
with the person is deemed to be representation of the entity, not the
person.
Irl·essence, the retroactive application of the entity rule simply gives
the person who retained the lawyer the status of being a corporate
constifuent during the period before actual i:hcorporation, as long as
actual incorporation eventually occurred.

Id, at 67. Und~r, th\) "entity theory" of representation, a corporate lawyeJ:; typi-,
cally is not disqualified from represenj;ing tl)e corporation in litigati9n between
the corporation and pne or more of its constituents. It also means that the corporat~ lawyer generally is not liab~e,to shareholders, ~fficers, or directors for
ljlalpractice or breach .offiquciary duty. Moreover, as sP,eci~cally.no,ted by the
court in Jesse v. D(J,n{orth, ~he identity of the client ,has implications with
respect to the attorney-client privilege. The coworation, and not the col}stituents, holds the privilege as to communic~tions perlaiJ;ling to j;he organization
of the entity. Individual constituents, however, hold the privilege where a communication does not relate directly to 'the purpose of organizing the entity.
If the lawyer's dealings with constituent indi'vi.duals become so extensive
and personal that the individuals reasonably believe that the lawyer represents them personally', a court or disdp1inary authonty might conclude that,
despite the "entity theory," a lawyer-client relatidrtshlp ha's nonetheless been
formed between the lawyer and the individual constituent. A:ttorneys should
be familiar with their own states' corporate laws when. evaluating possible
conflicts of interest questions in the·context'Ofbusiness representation.

Samples,of conflicts language for engagement letters often are available on
the web site,s of st!!te bars. For example, ~he Georgi~ Bar ~eb site includes a
lengthy "ReporJ; on Engagement. Letters in TransactionaJ Practice." That
report is availabl~ at http://www.gabar.org/public/pdffsectionslbuslaw/eltp.
pdf. The Colorado state bar web site also contains an iiiteresting exaniple, at
http://www.cobal:.org/repositdry/LPM%20Dept/FeeAgm'ts/EngageLtr
ConfiictoflnterestASparknlim.pdf?lD=260. The runerican College of Trust
and Estate Counsel offers samples, as well, at http://#ww.adec:org/public/
EngagementLettersPublic.asp.
PROB~Ef\'13-4

Three prospective clients meet with Law)'er ta·discuss a·new business venJ
ture. A, who has experience· in the business, would contributl!ib.is management
skills, B would contribute a substantial amount of cash, and C would contribute assets' that could be used in-the business. Each person would receive onethird of the stock in a newly formed corporation. A, Band C have asked Lawyer

1.'
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to create the corporation and to advise them with respect to tax and other
issues related to forming and operating the business.

a. May Lawyer represent all three individuals seeking to form the business? Whom should Lawyer represent in the case? How would you advise
,.
Lawyer to proceed?
b. ,Would your answer to (a), above, change if A, Band C brouglitin another
"partner," D, who would contribute property with an adjusted basis in
excess of value?
··
c. It a pispute were to arise among the three "partners," and one of them
decided to hire her own lawyer, could Lawyer continue to represent the
remaining ('partners"?
d. Suppose that you accept the representation n:; fu,ll compliance with your
ethi<;a,l obligations and that severa\ years later, A calls you to discuss
renegotiating her salary. How should you hapdle her call?
PROBLEM3-5
'
You recently filed a letter ruling request with the IRS on behalf ofSmithco, Inc.
to the effect that a series of contemplated transactions should, with application of
the s~p transaction doctrine, be treated as a tax-free reorganization. Jonesco, Inc.
has asketl you 'to represent it in Tax Court litigation in which its position will be
that a sitlinar series of transactions should not to be stepped together, but should
instead be treated as separate steps, with the result that there is no reorganization. Cany~u take the case?Wouldyour answer be different ifyou are representing
Sinitnco in Tax Court rather than in the ruling process? What is the answer if you
are representing S!nithco in connection with'an audit, after the transaction has
already been reported as a rflOrgamzation on a filed tax return?

D. When Business or Personal Relationships Fail
Human nature being what it is, disputes often develog between or among
business ''partn(jrs;• once business operations have commenced. Whether a lawyer previously worked with all of the co-venturers or merely represented the
entity, questions arise as to whether the attorney may continue in the representation and whom the attorney may represent. Among the-concerns is· the
possibility that the attorney received confidential information that may not be
used against a former client. While the case below arose out of a personal, not
a business, relationship, the ethical considerations are well exemplified.

DEVORE v. COMMISSIONER
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
963 F.2d 280 (1992)
PER CURIAM:
Gary Devore appeals from the United States Tax Court's denials of his motions
to vacate deficiency judgments for the tax years 1970-1975. Devore contends that

!luhl representation of himself and his ex-wifB'in the tax proceedings resulted in
ll confiic~ of interest that prevented their joint counsel from raising defenses on
his behalf. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C.§§ 7482(a), 7483. We reverse the

78
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orders of the tax court and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Devore was prejudiced by his former counsel's conflict JJf interest and
whether Devore had reasonable grounds for failing to seek independent counsel.
Background
For many years, Maria Cole and·her former husband, Nat King Cole, had
been represented by attorney Harry Margolis. Margolis continued to represent
Maria Cole after Nat King Cole's death. Maria Cole and .Gary Devore were
married in 1969, For the year 1970, Devore filed an individual return. Joint
returns were prepared for all other years during the marriage. Until June
1987, Harry Margolis was the sole counsel of Cole and De':ore. Leo I\ranton,Jr.,
became co-counsel with ~argolis in June 1987, Margolis died on or about July
15, 1987 aila<Ell.'anton 1:/ecatp'e the sole cbunsel of record on behalfo(Cole and
Devore in coru1E/ction with the. :fnstant actions. The tax proceedings culminated
in the entry oftwo'judgmenfs against Devore.
Cole and Devore were separated in,197fih~~ were divorced in 1978. The tax
court did not render judgmentS in the inst!fnt' cases until 1989. Despite their
divorce, joint counsel conti.riued to represent Cole and Devore throughout the
tax proceedings.
Afte~ a foo/ day ~al, th~ ,fax cpurt dete~mined that Devore was ind}Vi.dually
liable for a f()~ral tax d'lficren,cy of $13?,302, and for a negligent1!-;elA:r,n penalty of ~6,765. fhe tax, cou~ fouqd, that be:vqre failed .carry his ];mrden of
proof in ~stablis}jin_g t;l)a,t,c~rtain cheyKS totali.J;l.g $210,000 did not consti~t~
r<)portab~e,income to him: Two ~hecks hfl.d been jssued to Devore b;y a co111-pany
C<!ntro)led by Margolis. These chE:cks were receiv~d by De;vore, .~ut were immediately endorsed over to Jl:i:argolis. D,evore alleges t)iat these funds, were tll.en
used to purchase a home in the name of Maria Cole. The tax court foun'(I that
the $210,000 represented by the two checks was income attributable to

to

Devore.

~

·

~•

tn a second judgrllent entered pursuant to stipUlations of settlement; :Devore
!llld Cole were held jointly mid severally liable for:ileficiencies totaliil.g 'over
$300,000 for'the years 1971-1975.
I

Devore states that he entered and left; his marriage to, Cole with a net ,w,9rth
of less than ,$10, 000 and that he lacks the money to satisfy· the judgmenta.
He further states that he was unsophisticated iJ,1 tax mattE:!\!-and that h#l:,)VIltl
continually excluded from the financial affairs of Maria Cole.
, 1
Devore moved, through new counsel, to vacate the tax court's deficiency
judgments. He asserted, tl!at when CQJ.msel repr~Sjll_lted :Wm and Cole jointly, a
conflict of interest resulted.:rhis conflict, argues Devore, prevented joint counsel from bringing innoc~nt sppuse 'and agency defenses which would have
diminished his tax liability. The tax court denied these motions.
Wscussion
.A tax court's. decision not to reopen a record for the submission of new evidence "js not subj~Gt to review except upon a demonstration of extraordi.n§.ry
circumstances which reveal a clear. a)mse of discretion.'' Nor-Cal·A,djusters
u. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
,,,
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Our research uncovered only one case that is directly on point. In Wilson
v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 645 (2nd Cir.1974), a husband and wife had filed
joint tax retl.tl:ns. The husband earned a much larger income than his wife. A
deficiency judgment was entered against the couple. Throughout the tax proceedings, they were jointly represented by the same attorney. However, they
were also engaged in a simultaneous annulment action. In the annulment
action, the husband was represented by the same attorney who represented
the couple in the tru; proceed!ngs.
'
The Second ' Circuit
held that it could "reverse a discretionary denial by the
Tax Court of post-opinion motiOJtS only if t!l.ere are sho'Y" to be 'extra9:rdinary
circumstances.'" Wilson[,] 500 F,fld at ~48, quoting Pepi, Inc, v. C.I.R., 41? F.2d
141, 148
(2nd -Cir. 197l)... The court l;J.e),d
'
""' that. the ,facts in Wilson were sufficiently compelling to constitute "e~raordinary_ circumstanG~s." The attomey
could not competently advance the interests of the wife in the tax prpceedings
while representing the husband in a separate annulme;,t action. 'It thu;
reversed the tax court's denial of Mrs. Wilson's post-opinion motions. It
remanded the case to the tax court, allowing Mrs. Wilson to present evidence
explaining her failure to seek the advice of independent counsel and to raise
the annulment issue.
~

..

The facts supporting Devore's claim of "extraordinary circumstances" are
at least as compelling as those of Wilson. In Wilson, the atto'rney represented
both the husband and wife in tax proceedings while representing- the husband in a simultaneous annulment litigation. However, the couple was still
married at the time of the tax proceedings. In the instant case, the parties
were separated in 1976 and divorced in 1978. The trial did not take place
\llltil 1989: By this time, the marriage was clearly over. Arguably, Devore's
interests were compromised by counsel's simult;meous representation of
Devore and Col!'·

.

'

Accordingly, we remand to the tax court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Devore was prejudiced by his former counsel's conflict of interest and to
establish the reasonableness of his failure to retain independent counsel. If
Devore satisfies these burdens, he should be granted a new trial at which 4mocent spouse and agency defenses may be asserted.
'
The Devore case is somewhat unique in that the aggrieved spouse was the
ex-husband. Most often, innocent spouse claims are made by an ex-wife. Why?
What special responsibilities does this impose on a lawyer who perhaps has a
preexisting professional re~ationship with the ex-husband?
Many law firms are loathe to provide legal services at the Sai\le time to indivi<l)lals (e.g., estate planning) and businesses entities in wl,ri~h those ll;l.dividuals
oWir interests because djsagreements often arise between or among the individu:;t!s, creating painful conflicts of interest problems for lawyers. For an example of
such a conflict, see Pascale v. Pascale, 549 A.2d 782 (NJ 1988), infra, Section I.F.
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PROBLEM3-6

You have represented Mr. and Mrs. Mifdew in COil1;lecti'on with an audit of
their joint federal incom!i tai return. Following the audff, 'the IRS' is!Jues them
a joint notice of 'deficiency. You prepare a petition, which tbey both sign, and
which is then filed in the Tax Court. Two weeks before the case is scheduled to
go to trial, Mrs. Mildew calls, says they are getting divQrced and tells you that
her divorce lawyer has . discovered thlrt her husband was skimming cash
receipts out of their jointly owned restaurant without reporting them on the
couple's. tax returns. What are your ethicaJ and other obligations to each of the
Mildews, IRS counsel, and thEl. Tax Court?
' '
'J•

PROBLEM3-7
I'
Practitioner prepared a joint return filed by a married couple. The couple
later divdrced. May Practitioner represent both spouses in corul.ection with an,
IRS c!]allenge to expenses that were claimed on the joint return? Note that
Section 6013(e) (innocent spouse relief provision that app!iM atthetimeDevore
waS' decided) has been replaced'by'Se'ction 6015. Does your ap.alysis change
b,eba'use of tlie stat;utory c,fiange? What must Practitioner do if she decides to
accept repr~se~tation? .,
'
PROBLEMl,l-8

Several years ago, before •Husband man'ied Wife, Lawyer represented
Husband in connection with the formation of a business venture. Recently, Wife
approached ~awyer to req,ue.st representation in -9\vorce proceedings against
Hu!!\Janq. Can Lawyer accept the r~presentation? What are Lawyer's ethical
obligations?

E. Tax Shelters
During the last several years, taxpayers and the IRS have been actively
engaged in litigating over the tax consequences ~f transactions that the IRS
1
has lab e1ed •tax she!ters." For tax benefits generated from a purported tax
shelter transaction to be upheld, courts have consistently held that the trans·
action or series of transactions at issue must have economic substance. In an
often-quoted articulation of the ecenomic substance doctrine, the Court·'Of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated(
'
To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find J1i thl\t tjl.e taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax
benefits in entering the transaction, and [2] that the transaction has no
economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit
exists.
Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
The Circuit Courts of Appeals that ha~e considered the economic substance
doctrine agree'generally on the articulation of its two parts as seHorth mRice's
7byota, but differ on how to apply the test. Some circuits'have re4uired that a
transaction satisfY both tile business purpose and ecbholnic profit standards to
validate a transaction (conjunctiVe test). Other circuits require satisfa'ction of
only one of the standards to validate a transaction (disjunctive test). Some
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courts give more weight to one prong than the other, in some cases disregarding
one or the other of the two prongs altogether. In some, cases, court~ will consider
both prongs as merely factors, amon15 others, in determining whe~her a transaction has any practical econo)llic effects other than the creation of tax benefits.
The following problems exemplifY conflicts of interest issues arising in the
context of the economic substance doctrine.
PROBLEM3-9

Your law firm represents eighteen different clients who invested in a transaction sold by the same accounting firm. For each client, you must prove that
the client had a profit motive for investing in the transaction, which the IRS
hal? called a tax shelter. Can you offer the same profit motiye for each client
(e.g., expectation of a specific return on a series of hedging transactions)?
PROBLEM 3-10
If profit motive or business purpose is an essential element of proof to obtain
a deduction from a tax shelter investment, does representation of multiple
clients who invested in essentially the same transaction (1) dilute any single
client's chances of obtaining a favorable settlement or (2) impose .ethical constraints on the lawyer when additional clients are added to the representation
roster?
'
'

PROBLEM 3-11

With the informed consent of the parties, your'law firm has undertaken rep'
resentation of investors in a tax shelter ih proceedings before
the Tax Court in
which the tax benefits of the shelter are being challenged. During the pendency
of the proceeding, a sep'arate class action is brought against the sh!llter prOmoters on behalf of a putative class consisting of the investors in the snelter,
including some o~ your firm's clients. Your firm does not anticipate participating as counsel in the class action on behalf of either side. Can your firm continue in the Tax Court representation? See D.C. Opinion No. 165 (Jan. 21, 1986).
Would it matter whether, the promoters have agreed to pay all of your professional fees incurred by the investors in the Tax Court proceeding?
PROBLEM 3-12

An accounting fil'11.) developed and promoted a tax shelter in which your
firm's client invested. Can your firm represent that client at the same time that
it represents the accounting firm in malpractice cases that do not involv~. tax
shelters? Can your firm represent that client at' the same time that it represents the accounting firl)l in malpractice cases that do involve tax s~elters?
PROBLEM 3-13

Your law firm's banking department does loan documentation work for a
bank that provided financing for a tax shelter transaction. A tax department
client invested in one such tax shelter transaction. Can the firm represent both
the bank and the investor?
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PROBLEM3-14
Your law firm' r'epresents' a large insurance company on general corporate
and regUlatory matters. The insurance company sold a transaction, which the
IRS alleges is sub'stantially similar to a listed transaction but which the insural}ce.company claims was substantially different than the listed transaction, to
Invest~r. Can you represent Investor in connection with an, IRS audit?

F. Estate Planning
Conflicts of interest generally arise in estate planning in op.e of four
situations.
Spouses. First, and most commonly thought o:t; are conflicts involving con·
current representation o!spouses. (Many, but not all, of the same issues arise,
as well, wheh representing 'rlb.married cohabitants.) Children from prior marriages or large disparities in wealth between spouses might be a reason to suggest separate representation. Spouses of substantially different ages may have
conflicts in their planning goals. In-addition, when one spouse dies, the surviving spouse and tHe estate could have differing interests. For example, the surviving spouse may wish to make an election against the estate or the executor
may wish to make an election that increases the surviving spouse's share of the
estate wllile decreasing the· interests of other benefic'iaries. ·
Nonetheless, and despite all of the possible conflicts, spouses fr~quently
visit attorneys together for the purpose of preparing their wills. Often, these
are reciprocal wills -wills that are essentially mirror images of each other,
in which each spouse leaves his or her residuary estate to the other. Under
Model Rule ,1,. 7, a laWYjl) ~IJ:ould, in m?st cases, be able to rep),'esent aJ;1d plan
for both spouses jointly. Jl:e!"'evE\r, the lawyer should require each spouse to
sign a writ~n waiver o,t cop,fidentiality as to the other so that any information P~?.vided to ,the lawyer, by either spouse must .b,e revealed to the othe;r
sv,ouse. ~I informatiojl provid~d to the lawyer, of course,, woul!l still be
protect~jl against disq/osure to third parti~s. The reluct!'n7e of a spouse to
sig;n a waiver shop~<l. alert the lawyer, to the possible, existence of a nonwaiyable conflict
•
.... of interest.
'

.

.

1'he lawyer rliust explain to both spouses that their-interests could conflict;
particularly where they do not agree on the identity of beneficiaries or fiducia·
ries. Under Model Rule 1. 7, each spouse must sign this statement, agreeing to
allow the lawyer to use his or J.>'ir best effort'} and judgment to represent each
of them, despite' these possible conflicts.'It would be wise for the lawyer and
spolises to agtee'that botlr spouses•must'be present whenever either wishes to
ch\1Ilge an~'Ofhis'or her estate planning documents.
· ·,
(

j

?

I

__.,

'

'!;he American Collez_e P.f.Trust and Estate Coun~el,offers samples of con;
f!icts lan~age for eng~g~!fient letters in estate p~g,,at http://'?'Y.W.actec,
org/public/EngagementLettersPublic.asp. The Colorado state bar web site also
contains a good example, at http://www.cobar.org/repository!Inside_Bar!Trust
Estate/OrangeBook_Dec2007_Engage'mentLetter.pdf?lD=2841.
Faniilies. Second, conflicts inay arise where parents and children seek representation or advice. A parent and child might have different ideas about the
use or disposition of a trust fund benefitting the child, or an adult chilll and an
infirm parent might disagree about transfers of the parent's pN:Iperty. Gonflicts
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also often arise when adult children are involved in a family-owned business,
which forms a substantial portion of a parent's estate.
Particularly where the lawyer is approached by an adult child or children in
connection with estate planning for a pareut, care should be given to. the question of who is the client - the adult child(ren) or the parent? Surprisingly,
intentions in this regard are often unclear: is the ptirpose of the representation
to P,lan for the disposition of the parent's assetij as he or she intends or tp protect the interests of a particular' beneficiary? If the attorney previously represented either the parent or the child, the attorney might possess confidential
information, gained' through the course of that representation' that would be
'
inconsistent with representing the other.•
'·

Once it is determined who the client is, it is important to make sure that
everyone understands and agrees. Even whe~e.such an. understanding is
reached, however, maintaining confidentiality between lawyer and client (\{'ten
P~llsents challenges. For example, elderly clients mal feel more comfor~aple
meeting with 'the lawyer in the company of their children. Significant decisions
are made at these meetlngs and it is the attorney's respoflsibility establish
a clear and confidential line orcommunication without tlie presence or undue
influence offfllllily membilrs.'i\ttorneys are strongly advised to talk to the client
iuo;,e to make sure that problelns, of conflicts of interest and undue influence
do I}Ot rup.st,,and,to expiain confidentiality concerns.

to

•

•t

•

Businesses •and their Constituents. Third, a•,conflict may arise when a lawyer represents a business entity and a majority or controlling owner, as was
discussed earher in' this chapter. Additional issues arise where busin~ss and
est!j.te plai\Iling overlap. For example, an estate plan of a majority shareholder
of a' closely-held corporation could affect the busjness plans or ownership of the
corporation ~as well as· the relationship between the corporation and ptlier
shareholders. '
·
'

PASCALE v. PASCALE

.

'

New Jersl'y Supreme Court
549 A.2d 782 (1988).
PoLLOcil:,J.

ro

Plaintift\ John J, Pascale (Pascale), seeks set aside a transfer of stock and
real estate to his son David P. Pascale (David). Pascale contends that a confidential relationship existed between him and David and that the same attorney
advi~ed both of them in connecti~p. with ,the transfer. The issue is whether the
transfers ar~J invalid because David exercised undue influence' over Pascale.

~··
Nearly fifty years ago, in 1939, Pascale founded a machine tool and die business, which was later incorporated under the name Quality Tool & Die Company
Inc. (Quality).ln 1952, plaintiff established a second, smaller machine tool
company, Majeda Tool and Die Company (Majoda), which operated out of

'
4

Moreove'r, if the parellt is incapacitated or appears to suffer from a diminished capacity; par·
ticular issues pertaining td such a representation must be considered. Discussion of such matters
is beyond the scope of this book.
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Quality's premises· in Hoboken. By 1960, both businesses had become quite
profitable.
In the 1960s, Pascale intmduced his ol4er son, John, Jr., into tlie businesses,
and six :years later, Pascale gave all the stock in Majoda to John, Jr, ·David
began full-time employment with Quality in 1971. Sometime before 197·2, John,
Jr.Jeft Majoda and assigoed•all·ofhis stock to Pascale and• David.
In March 1972, Pascale's wife iostituted a divorce action, and the 'two sons
chose sides: .John, Jr. sided with hls mother, ~d DaVid"with Pascale:
Cpns~!).\'.~lltly; Pascale did not ~ee,:rohn, Jr. agaio un~il their apparent r!lc,qnciliation io '1978. In 1973, to 'mioimize his net worth and thereJ>y to ,redu.ce liis
wife's share in an equitable distribution of his assets, Pascale signed a stock
certificate, Which purported to transfer ownerslu'p of his Quality shares to
David.' The certificate, however, was backdated _to 1968, four years before the
ios*ution of the. divorce action.
' rxi!t(a)ly, the frlJ.U~ Wo;rked.'An accounting firm,, which Wa~ aP,po4'ted DY thjl
matrimonial C?,urt<t\>,inve~tibite Pascale's assets, reP,orted on Jpne 7; 1973, tha~
Pascale was "ess!ln~ally res.11onsible'' for the opepitions of Quality ari~.Majoda,
!;nit that he had transferr!lif h\~ stock fu bpth corporatjons to Davi,d on October
~.6 1 ,1968. The matrimonia!'court a~proved the P,ropert;:Y' ~e'ttlement ba~ed on this
false information. Although PasqruJ cla],ms tiiat the stock ,cert#icflte and corpo-.
rate books are lost, David produced atthe trial'ofthe Within matter a photocopy
of a signed copy ofthe<backdated.October l6,.19Jl8; stp~k ~aate.

C~~~i~tent With the certiftcl'te, David claimed in his deposition that Pascale
transferred all the Quality stock to him in 1968. David'denied that any transfe~ of sto,ck from his..fat'her to l)im occur;ed lie~~een 1970 ·and 1976. Wlj,en
askep \lt trial who owned the ~ya'i~y stock lq ~976, however, David ~~tified,
''my tather did." The foregoiog tacts led the 'trial court to find that Pascale
signed the backdated certificate in 1973 as part of "a scheme to defraud
[Pascale's] wife and the matrimonial court."
Following the transfer, Pascale and David contip.ued in their respective
roles at Quality. Until1979, Pascale r~aihed in' control, with David managing
accounts and performiog otlter office work. From '1971 until late 1981, Pascale
and David enjoyed a close personal relationship. Pascale lavished expensiv.e
gifts on David and his wife, includiog cars, real estate, a sable coat, jewelry, and
large amounts of cash. David handled Pascale's personal financial affairs, such
,
as check writing, personal bills, safe deposit,boxEJs;·and securities.
Late io 1975, howev~, the Internal Rev~nue Service asserted a tax deficie~c~
claim against Pascale perso~aily arid. also agai'rl~t 'Quality. On the advice of his
personal and busioess' accountant, J. Bennettlichwktz, Pascale retained a tax
attorney, Bernard Berkowitz, who resolved the IRS matter in January 1979. In
the interim, Pascale asked Berkowitz to prepare an estate J;lan for hjl;n. .,

'

Early in his representation on both matters, Berkowitz communicated exclusively with l?ascale. P-ascale, however, -directed Berkowitz to "deal directly with
David Pascale. or Ben Schwartz: but primarily David.~' Accordiog to Berkowitz,
Pascale instructed him to develop an estate plan that left "everythiog to David"
w!J,ile ,incurring as little tax liability as possible. ,David C!;>$llled Berkowitz's
testimony. by acknowledging-that he served as an agent for Pascale io dealing
with Berkowitz.
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As early as 1977, Berkowitz and his associate, Stephen C. Levitt, discussed
with David and Schwartz an estate plan that would have.left Pascale in control
of Quality. For tax purposes, Berkowitz recommended that Pascale .transfer•to
Quality land he owned in Hoboken and that Pascale convert his common stock
in: Quality into three classes: preferred stock,' voting common stock, and i:wnvoting'common: stock. The then-existing value of Quality would be ascribed to
the preferred stock, which Pascale would retain along with all'the votlng'cbfumon stock. David would receive the nonvoting common sto& to which all futtite
growth would be attributed.
'
'•, '·
In May 1978, Berkowitz worked out the details of the recapitalization with
David and Schwartz, who in turn informed Pascale o(the plan.' A1tnough
Pascale approved the recapitalization, 'the plan was never execut~d.
'

'

·A year later, on May 9, 1979, Berkowitz, Levitt, and Schwartz met with
David. At this meeting, while reading the 1973 accountant's report from the
matrimonial action, Berkowitz first learned that Pascale apparently had transferred the Quality shares to David in 1968. It became apparenMo Berkowitz'
that there was a conflict between David and Pascale about the ownership of the
Quality stock. As Berli:owitz testified, "David Pascale thought he own~ the
stock; John Pascale thought that he owned the stoc!c" Because the recapitalization plan was pr~mised on Pascale's ownership of the Quality stdck, the
confusion about stock ownership caused Berkowitz to abandon this plan. '

..

'

,, .

Berkowitz also ascertaine_d that no gift tax had been paid on the backdated
transaction. Confronted with this information, Berkowitz devised an alternate
plan to fulfill Pascale's intention of.Jeaving, with a minimal tax impact, alJ of
his business assets to David. The plan was for Pascale to give the Hoboken
ptoperties and the Quality stock.to Daviq, with David paying thE! gift t'axes of
$ 54,947. That proposal was consistent With the will prepared' by a difThrep.£
attorney and executed by Pascale'on becember 10, 1975, in whlch Pasca.Je left
his entire estate to David. Berkowitz further believed that the gift to bavid
would reduce the problems inherent in the fraudulent matnmonial scheme;
which was evidenced by the backdated stock certificate.
,, .
The trial court found that Berkowitz discussed the alternate pian with
David and Schwartz, and that each ofthem in turn discussed it with Pas2ale.
Both David and Schwartz claimed that Pascale understood 'th11t by agreeing
with this plan, he would be yielding control of 'Quality to David. lnd!led,
Schwartz testified that he spoke with Pascale on May 24, 1979, the day Pascale
executed the alternate plan, and specifically am,;onished him that by executing
the plan, ''he was giving the company away, he could be thrown out~ a week."
On tl).at date, Berkowitz, David, and Pascale met at Pascale.'s· office in
Hoboken to execute the plan. According to Levitt, with the exception of several letters that his law firm had mailed to Pascale, this meeting was the first
time since January 11, 1978, that the firm ''had any contact or has any records
that reflect any contact with John Pascale." At the meeting, Pascale signed
various documents, including two stock certificates.. of Quality: one that
described Pa~cale as the owner of 310 shares, and the other that described
David as the owner' of 310 shares. Pascale also slgned f\Il a~sigilflleJ?.t transferring his 310 shares of Quality to Davia, a deed from Pascale and Quality
conveying the Quality premises in ·Hoboken to David, and an affidavit of
consideration.
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. 'J'he main dispute in this case is· whether Pascale understood that these documents effected an outright transfer of the Quality stock a:il.ct real estate to
David. On this point, as on others, the•testimony at ·trial was in sharp conflict.

"
Ac<;ording
to Pascale, before the May 24, 1979, meeting, he had not received
a:py of the docllments. He contends that he had no opportp;lity to read the
d~ftum~n.J;s. before, ~igJJ.ing them, tJ;lat neither Berkowitz J;l.Or J?~V;id explain~d
tiie liocument~ to him, and that, he :.;elied on them in signing. the do~uments.
Pascale testified that he thought he ''was to have control [o( Quality] to the day
I died or" was incapable of handling the business."
· '
, pR.Yld an!! J;ietko,Witz testified, how)'yer, that Berk9wif~ reyi~\':!l<i the docuwitq Pas,cale b~fore he signed them. Berkowitz did not .1~membe~
ments in ue~ail
1
whether he discussed' with Pascale the implications of transferring the Quality
stock and the Holioken propertieS to David, but he believed/that the implications
were so obvious that such a discussion was• unnecessary. David, however, testified
thatBerkowitz explained to l?ascale that the effect of signing the documents would
be to-relinquish control of Quality to David. Pascale signed the documents.
t•rf
1 ~
'
On the same day, David executed a will prepared by Berkowitz, in which
DaV;id bequeathed all his Quality stock to a testamentary stock trust, of which
Pasc',\JQ
the trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust were fascale and David's
"" was
'
wife, and all income was payable to Pascale during his lifetime. In the following year, 'on October 7, 1980, however, David executed another will, which
eliminated the trust and provided that the Quality stock and land would pass
to his·wife, if she survived, and if she predeceased him, to his mother-in-law.

..

.

.

Xfte" the, May 24, 1979, meeting, Daviq as,s,ume\1 greater responsibility in
n;tanaging
Quality.
Pascale remained active in
.the.. business, and continued to
•
k
..
'
receiVfl his.$ 3,500 weekly salary, plus approximately$ 700 in travel and entertainment .expenses. In January 1980, however, David attempted to reduce
Eiiscale's salary to.$ 3,000 per week1 but Pascale responded by retroactively
re!rls~atin/l", his salary to $ 3,500.
.
~

Relations between David rui.d Pascal~ cooled when David learned that Pascale
was helping John, J;r. in a competing machine and tool business. According to
Pasc;Je, he first learned that he was no longer in control of Quality in October
l9111\lllo\Ying:l'- ?ispute with David over Pascale's assistance to John, Jr. David
ordered Pdscafe to leave the Quality preJ;Uisl's an9. to consult with a lawyer to
co¢\rm that DaviA nO}V contr?lled Quality an!! had the right to terminate Pascale's
~mployment. Notwithstanding their dispute, Pascale remained on Quality's payroll ';;uti] October ~982, two mQnths after he filed the within aption. Ill the jnterim,
during the spring of 1982, Pascale consulted with Levitt, who told him that the
effect ofthe"May 24, 1979, transfers was to place David in control of Quality.
I

***

[T)he trial court found that Pascale's attorney, Berkowitz, was not in a position
of conflict when he prepared Pascale's estate plan and advised him to execute it,
stating, "[a]t all times Berkowitz was Pascale's rather than David's attorney."
• The Appeilate bivfsion reversed. 216 N.J. Sup,er. 13~. It f9und that a
~oJ;~lid,en11a! relationship existed Between Pascale ap.d David, and that Berkowitz
+as. ht'a position, of con,flict when ~~ a~vised PascaJe to execute the transfers.

***
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We now turn to the question of the conflict of interest on the parti-ofthe attdrney,
Berkowitz, in representing both David and Pascale at the time of the challenged·
transfer. Here, we also agree with the Appellate Division's assessment that
Berkowitz was in a position of conflict in representing both parties. Berkowitz and
his associate, Levitt, admitted tl).at there was a confl,ict in the positjons of David
and Pascale concerning the ownership of the ~uality stock prioll'tQ May 24, 1979.
Mor~ovej:, David admitted Pascale 'fas nevjlr informed of the se,rvices,rendere<!- by
Berkowit~ in, preparing David's estate plan. ~espite the fact.fil!lt I)aviq lf)d
~erkowitz ~at he, ~gt Pascale, owned the Quality stock on M_ay 9, 197~, Ber¥-owi~
simulta,neously repre§ented David and. Pa~cale, Neither Berkowitz nor,pavid ever
informed.Pascale, however, of David's claim to the stock or that ~erkowitz.was now.
repl,'esenlfu.g Dj1vid. Nonetheless, the trial covrf; found:that "[a]t all times )3erkowitz
'Yas Pascale's rather than David's attorney." The Appellate Division :.;ejected that
fin~ and found that Berkowitz was in a position of ~onflict because ofhis si.nu.t11
~eous. representation of the parties. 216
•
. N.J. Super. at 142: We agree.,

.

.

As we have'previously stated, "[a]lawyer'cannot serve two masters in the sanie
subject matter if their interests are or may became [sic] actually or potentially in
conflict." ln;re Chase, 68 N.J. 3~2, 396 (1975). Disciplinary ll.ule 5-105(A), which
was ip., e_ffect. ~t the ljime of the transaction, like present Rule. of Professional
9on<j.~ct 1.7,.prohibited a lawyer from accepting or continuir!g employment :'if tp.e
exercise ofqs professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely ,to be
ady~rsely affected by the acceptance of' or continuance of th,e employme~t.
A conflict arises when an attorney represents in separate matter's. multiple
clients who ]).ave adve~Sil interests in at least one ofthose matters, 'IDeveJqpm!lnts
in tJ:~ Law - Confli~ts of ,Interest in the Legal Profession," ,94 ,Harv. It· Rey.
1244. 1296-1306 (1981). The attort~ey has divided loyalties ,that can prevent
r~~-~tilfpiYew~sentation of both clients in the matter in which tl;le conflic.t.arises.
Ibid., ¥.P.r examp~e, ap. attorney may not, wij;hout ma¥ng appropriate disclosure, simultaneously represent the ~estator and the beneficiaries of a will.
Haynes, supra, 87 N.J. at 181-85. Suni!arly, here, Berkowitz sl:J,'?uld not hav;e
represented Pascale on the transfer of real estate and. stock to David witlwu,t
disclosing that he was simultaneously representing David on an independent
matter. •Even if Berkowitz believed he could 'adequately represent the interests
of both Pascale and David, he failed to comply with the requfremenli of
Disciplinary Rule fi-105(C) that he fully disclose the conflict.
Consequently, we agree with the -t\ppellate Division that the conflicting claims
to ownership oj'.the Q1,1ality stock plae<;d Berkowitz in '1- po~iJ;i.qn of conflict arising
from his dual ~epr~entation of David.and P&scal<j. On the same day,, B~r)rowtz
represented Pascale in the transfer of substantial assets to David and also
reptesentM David in the drafting'and execution ofhis will. Tile cmiflicting claims
of stock o'ivnership, as the Appellate Division found, "raisetl an immediate conflict
having the clear'potenlial to raise in the mind ofiegal' counsel the question as to
which of the two masters was to be served and protected." 216 N.J. Super. at 142.
. Referrals. Finally, an attorney is often asked to r.ecommend a particular
bank, trust company or person to serve as a trustee or executor knowing that
the comj)any or person will hire the attorney who'drafted the will as'attdrney
for the e~tat!). Becal.)se this situation P,Oteptially creates a, C~Jnfiict between thE\
client and the lawyer's own interest, it should be analyzed under Model Rule
1.7(a)(2) and Circular 230 § 10.29(a)(2).
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Dlinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 99-06·
(Nov. 1999)5
Facts
An Illinois trust company has developed a lawyer/trust administrator proJ
gram in which licensed 'filinois'~iawyers, who ·practice substantially in the
area of'estate'plaiming, enter into an ·agency relationship with the trust co'mpilr:ly: 'l'lie agency agreement provides that the lawyers Will furni~h trust
adminfstra'tor services for trusts in which the trust co~pany has'lieim named
trustee. The lawyers perform the administrative services for the trUst from
their law offices and may continue to render legal services to the ~lients in
matters related to the trust or otherwise, for' which they bill separately. Once
accepted as a trust administrator, the lawyers may refer clients and other
persons as potential customers for-the trust company's services. Th~' lawyer will bill his clients for legal s~rvices in preparing trust instruments and
oth~r documents. The trust company does not prep!).re t~e trust documents or
othezy;ise practice l;1w.
Assets of the trusts are deposited with the trust company and aaministerea
by the trust company's investment advisors or, at the optio:O. of the'client,'in
self-direct\)d accounts. Services of the trust company personnel are paid from
the trust assets pursuf!.Ilt to an established fee schedule, andthe1awy)lr/trust
administrator is paid a fee by the ti:ust company, again under a priblisl\ed fee
sched.u].e, from the fee pajd to the trust company from the client's trpst.
''l'he;ta\vyerltrust administrator acts as a conduit o'f information: betw!Jen the
trust company and its customers, directs payments front tile trust, (orwards
customer 'i,nvestmerit' directives, and responds on behalf of the trust CQmpany
to customer inquiries. The lawyer/trust administrator offers no 'invl)stmell.t
advice .with respect to tlie tntsts. The-lawyer's relationship witkthe trust cdrri:
panY, hi~ compensation as trus'e administrator, and other relevant inforfnati(\n
are set out in an extensive written disclosure and consent form whicll the client
nl.ust si~ as par'i of the trust agreement.
.
~, I

·i

.

I

Inquicy is made as to whether the arrangement descri,bed violf!teS any provision of the ,Rules of Professional Conduct..

..

..

Opinion
· A variety of issues created by relaFonships involving lawyers, their clients
an.d fiduciary'institutions have been considered by this Conpnittee.
'

I

}~

We have state.d, for 1\Xample, that a lawyer ,who is both a director and lawyer
for !\bank may not insist that his cliel)t design.ate the bank as a fiduciary, even
wh~r~ the relationship is disclosed tp th,e client. See Opinion.No. 90,02,(1990) .

..

I •'

~ R'iiprinted with pennission of the ll!ii.ois State Bar Association. Copyright by:the ISBA; on the
web at www.isba.org. ISBA Advisory Opinions on 'Professional Conduct are. prepared as an
educatioD;l)l service to members of the ISBA. Whilr~ the Opinions ~press the ISBA in\eryretation
of the ~llinois,Rules of Professional Conduct and other n;levant material{;, in r~sponse t9 a specific
hyPothesized fact situation, they do D.ot have tJie we~ht oflaw and should not be relied upon as .a
substitute for individual legal advice.
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We have also opined that it is professionally improper for a• lawyer employed:
by an 'institution marketing revocable living trusts to prepare or review such
documents 'for possible-use by hi& clients: Such an arrangement, We'felt, posed
significant conflict of interest prqblems. that would prevent ·the lawyer•rrom
fairly representing the consumer/client and acting in his best interests.nfu.
addition, thlllawyer violated Rule 5~(b) by aiding ;the unauthoriz~td pra,ct,iGe of
in connection with its preparation of
the tl'Ul\t
doculaw by the institution
•
•
•
•
'
.I
menta. See Oprmon No. 90-20 (1991).
I

r<

i•

•

I

I

'

I

Fimilly, we have held that,thj:l referral of clients to an ipvestm<\flt a\lvisor or
securities broker, whereby the referritig' lawyer is paid fee from the funds
being managed for the clien't; may lle permissible provid~d that appropriate
'
' '
disclosures are made. See Opiiifon No. 97-04 (19981.

a

' The Committee cortsiders the arrarrglm\ent outliiieil above sufficient to ~at
iszy the concerns expressed in our prlor opinions, provided that appropriate
safeguards are employed to satisfy the rul!ls regarding confliCts' of in~. ,

.

'

Wher~

a lawyer's -representation of a client may be limited by the lawyer's,
resppnsibilities·to a third person <>r by the lawyer's own interests, the lawyer
may. :undert!lke or continue the representation only if he reasonably beli~yes
tQat the-representation will not be. adversely affected and the client consents
after discJosure. }tule 1.7(b) states the general rule:
A lawyf)r shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may'·be mawrially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ap.othEJr
di,ent or to a third p~rson, or bY the lawyer's own interest, unle~s:
-'. (1)' the la~yer reasonably believes' the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
'
(2) the client .conse,;_ts after disclosure.
,-j

}

.

.

•

Here, the lawyer as an agent of the trust compal}.y is expected to develop
busln~ss for t:he trust coniP,any by recommenaing the tru'st company's s~ces
tq the lawyer's clients and 'otliels;,WJt'lre th~ trust coll!pany )s seh;cteq by ~~
client, the lawyer is paid a fee for his services as trust administratm; by the
trust co,mpany pased upon the' i:e~ ~or trust ser.vice~ paid b)l the c~e~tl~stoll!~r.
The)awyer ,accordiJigly ha.s an inGentive to recommend the trust cofjipany's
se~ces ,o'ler those of a CO!fipetin,g fiduciary. The relationshi.11 between the law,yer a.J;l,d the trust col)lpany, and the compeJ?.sation ~enerated by that relationship, involve "responsibilities to a third person" and "tbe lawyer's own interests,"
as described in th,e rule.
·
·•
'

'

"

Nonetlfeless, the lawyer may, in the Committee's judgment, reasonably
believe that his rep~esentation of the ~lient may not be adversely affected by
his relationship with the trust company. Since the client may disagree, however, it is incumbent upon the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of
Prqfessional Conduct, to QiS~>lose his relationship with th\l, trust compa,ny, the
fee a.rranl!"ement, and method of calculation (inchiding 'the source of payment to
him), and .all other aspectsl of the relation,s!lip. Although the rule dQes not by its
tennf! re,quire that th,e disc!osv.re be in writing, tQe Committee has note4 that
tha~ is the more p,rudent pra,ctice.

•In our Opinibn No. 97-04, supra, the Committee had occasion to consider
two slightly different referral arrangements involving lawyers, their clients,
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and an investment adviser and securities broker. In: each case, the referring
lawyer.was paid-a portion of.the management fee g\)nerated by the investment
of the client's funds. Wr; pointed out that such. an aJJrangement constituted a
business transaction with ,a,client, governed by Rule 1.8 of the Rules of
Ptofessional Conduct, which provides:
. Unless the client has consented after 'disclosure, a lawyer shall not enter
into a transaction 'with th~ client if:
(1) the lawyer knows 9r reaso11ab~y should kJ;to~ that the lawyer and client have or ~~Y have cpnfiicting interf.sts tjlerein; or
'
(2) t,he client exp_e~ts thr.lmVY,er to exrrcis,e the lawyer's profe.ssionaljudgment therein for the'proq,ction of the; client.
We stated that, under Ji';lrtinent Illinois case law, 'l- presumption of undue
influence aris<(S where a lawyer l)enefits from a busiJ!ess transact!on,with a client. 'l)}e presumption may be re):mtted only by clear and convincing evidence.
Gener31ly, this requires a' sh~wing of fun disclosure of all rerevant information,
a transaction that was fair and reasonable, and that the client had the 'advice of
independent counsel, or the oppottuuity for such advice, befure entenng into the
transaction. In re Anderson, 52 Ill. 2d 202, 287 N.E.2d 682, 682 (1972); •In re
Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d 6, 61 Ill. Dec. 540, 424 N.E.2d 1137 (1982); Franciscan Sisters
Health Care v. Dean, 95 TIL 2d 452, 69 Ill. Dec. 960, 448 N.E.:td 8'72 (1982).
As in Opinion No. 97-04, the investment of the client'stnist assets in the
case at ha'nd is clearly a business transaction. ·The profits realized :from the
investment program are the basis.for the•tnl.st company's >fees frbm which, in
turn, the lawyer/tr:ust administrator's fees are p\(id. As in OpiJ;rion No. 97-04,
these fees are not for legal services performed; they tJm'fll,ate from a business
transaction in which the lawyer and thE( client are jointly interested.

Since the amount of the lawyer/trust administrator's fee is affected by the
performance or the trust being ~dministered, tr,ere'is at least the potential for
a 'conflict of interest between tb:'.!'lawyer arid J\is 1client. The client's objectives
with r\)~pect to the trust program may dictate. arE!latively conservative investriient ?Pproach;l.v'hich rtitiy generate lesser fees to the trust administrator (and
th!i'tmi~t company) than would a more aggressive approach. Discloslrre musj;,
' :
'
'
.
. obtamed
. '.m the same manner as
therefote
be made
and .the chent's
conse'rit
prescribed with res{lect to Rule 1.7(b). It should also be remembered that a
<:onfiict of inierest problem, althougli initially a"ddressed by appropriate disclosure and consent, imposes a continuing duty on the part of the lawyet to make
·
supplemental disclosures as developing circumstances warrant.
For tlie reasons given, the Cominittge beli'eves that the arrangement
' J '
de'scribed is not professionally improper.
lll:iliois' version of Rule l.ll(a) is based on the Model Code DR'5-104 rather
tlian the Model Ru1e. The c'ase law relied on in the Opinion, howeVllr, is more or
les~ consistent with Model Rule 1'.8(a): the transaction must be fair and rea'
sonable to the c1ient, the lawyer must fully dfl'lclose all relevant information,
and the client must obtain the advice of independent counsel or have opportunity 1;Q ob~ain ~uch advice befo1;e entering_into the·transa<;_tiop. Moreover,.the
Opinion ,p.otes th~t prudent practice eqtails ,obtaining the client's writte)l
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consent to the essential terms of, and the lawyer's role in,.the transaction, as•is
required.by Model Rule l.S(a).

' · ·,

,.

PROB~~3-15

pj

'

J '- f

'

You are asked to do estate planning and will drafting> for Billl th.e majorit;y
shareholger anfl CEq o~ Widgets, ~nc; (a regular p,rm cliep.t), an.~ Bill's ~fe,
Mary.

'

I

t,

•

:•

·a. What must<you initially advis~ Bill nnd Mary·before agreeing to take on
their estate planning? •
"'
' · •· ,.,, • ·
•: .
b. Assume that after havintfheard'yo~~ initial' advi~~. Bill and
still
prefer to have you handle all of their estate planning. They provide you
with the appropriate informea ·consen't.\Vhat would that be?
c., You do- the planning and draft the wills, which Bijl and Mary execute,
but you Jl.Otice that Bill dqes,npt have a buy-sell agreelllent with Fr~d;
the. CFQ of Widgets, who is also the minority shareholder. What should
you do now?
d. The buy-sell agreement is drafte'd to provide'that on the' occurrence of
certain events (death, divorce, or bankruptcy of a shareholder), the companY.. )"ill buy back: the sharehpld~r's shares i.Jl• the c9mpany, with th'l
valuation determined on a formula basis. When the ag;reement is ready,
Bill offers to set up a meeting for the two of you and Fred in: order to get
the agreemerit signed. At that meeting, you-ask how Widgets.will fund
the share repurchase, particularly in the case·of Bill's death. BilJ.says,
"Don't worry. It wpn't be a problem.:' Fred js concerned, but doesn't pursue the issue. Are you• ready to let Bill and Fred sign the agreement?
e. The buy-sell agreement is. signed. As yo)l sit at your son's soccer game
tw~ Y.eat;s late~, ypu hear from !ffiOther parent (who works for Widgets)
tl)at~ill hru:' been having an affair with Wit;!gets' sales mljilager, Melody,
.for ':wontqs." WPat should you qq?.••
f. Mar.y calls you latel'thlit fall, nQtes that she and BiJl.are'·getting a divoree,
ant;! 'asks yomto'draft a new will for hen•Can you do this? Can your firm
continue tb represent Widge£s?
, .
_'.

Ma:i'y

j

I

>

I

•

PROBLEM 3-16

Lawyer has represented Husband :U::d W:il'~ for many years in a range of
personal matters, including estate planning. HuSbanti and Wife have substantial indiVidual a8s'ets, and tliey also own substantial jointly-held' property.
Recently, Lawyer prepafed'new updated wills that Husband and Wife' signed.
Like their previous wills, the new wills primarily benefit the surviving spouse
for his or her life, with beneficial disposition at the death of the survivor being
made equally to their children,(none ofwh?l!). were from a ~ri?r marriage).
'

.

Husband, Wife, and Lawyer have always shared all relevant asset and financial
information. <funsistent,with previous practite, Lawyer met 'With Husband and
Wife together to confer regarding the changes to be made in updating their wills.
.Se~eral months aftel"lthe execution of the new wills, Husband .confers separately with Lawyer. 'Husb\'fid' reveals to Lawyer that he has just executed a
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codicil (pFepared by another law firm) that makes a substantial beneficial dis,
position to a woman with whom Husband has been having an extra,marital
relationship. Husband tells Lawyer that Wife does not know about the relationship or the new codicil, as to which Husband asks Lawyer to advise him
regarding Wife's rights of election in the ·ev1mt she were to survive Husband.
Wha~ .are Lawyer's etl}ical obligations? .
,
'
Suppose tliae Lawyer tells Husban<fthst LaWyer cannot advise him regarding
Wife's rights and that Lawyer is withdrawing from representation ofboth Husband
and Wife. What are Lawyer's obligations with•respect to informing or not informing Wife of the substance of Husband's revelation if Husband does not do so himself? S.ee Florida Bar OpiniOI). !)5-4 (M'i'Y 30, 1!').~7, reuised, J;une 23, 2009) .

.

.,

• PROBI.JEMS-17
Your law firm regularly engages ·an appraisal firm·to prepare appraisal
reports for use in family limited partnership transactionS and as litigation support for valuation issues. The appraisal firm did a valuation of C\)rporate stock
that was an integral part of a tax shelter. Can you represent an investo:trin the
tax shelter in connection with an IRS audit or Tax Courtjitigation?

II. CONFmCTS BETWEEN LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
Cirp\}lar 230 §§ 10.27 and 10.29
Internal Revenue Manual. 'll4.11.55.4.2 (Appendix I)
Model Rules 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8
AICPA ET § 302 and Interpretation 302-i (AppendiX J) ·
'

.

Among the circumstances described in the general rule governing conflicts
of interest, Model Rule 1.7, is one that bans a lawyer from representing a client
if there is 'a significant risk that the representation will be· materially limited
by a personal interest of the law'yer. Circular'230'§ 10.29(a)(2) contains a similar rule. Model Rule 1.8 identifies specific instances of such conflicts and prescribes rules <and ·procedures for dealing with them; in some· instances, the
client may waive a conflict while, in others, representation. is strictly prohibited. (Situations that are not specifically addressed in Model Rule 1.8. r.emain
subject to the more general strictures of Model Rule 1.7.)

PROBLEM 3-18
A brokerag~ house performed all of the• qption tra~s at issue in tax shelt!lr
transactiop.s entered into by your Client..The sam~j firm manage~ all of the
401(k) accounts of your law finp.. po you have a conflict of interest?
'•

.

Lawy'er has a number of est~~ planning clients whO poufd benefit from
financial planning advice. She is considering establishing a relationship with
Financial,J?lanner, who would pay her a referral fee for each clienilshe refers to
him. Can Lawyer accept the referral fee?
Suppose that.Lawyer and Financial Planner wish to entev•into· a reciprocal
arrangement undeF which La~er. would refer clieD;tS to Financial Planner•for
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financial planning services and Financial Planner would refer clients to Lawyer
for legal services. See Model Rule 7.2(b)( 4); Philadelphia and Pennsylvania'Bar
Associations Joint <!pinion 2000-100 (May 2000); Supreme Codrt of Ohio
Opinion 2000-1 (Feb. 11, 2000).
,,
·PROBLEM·3-20

Lawyer holds a patent on an estate planning'strategy that might be useful
to Client. Can Lawyer ethically recommend the 'strategy to Client? If so, can
Lawyer charge Client a license fee (for use of the patent) in addition to her
customary fee for estate planning services?·
PROBLEM 3·21

Lawyer has provided tax and other legal advice to a limited liabilitY' company (LLC) in a traditional fee-for-service relationship. LLC's business has
grown over time and 1ts members oelieve that it should have a general counsel.
They have'asked Law1er to take on this responsibility, on a part-time basis. In
lieu of fees for this work, the LLC members liave proposed to give Lawyer a
20 percent ownership interest in LLC and a percentage of the company's prof·
its, if any. If Lawyer accepts this position, she would continue her private prac·
tice representing other clients, Under what circumstances is Lawyer ethically
permitt:ed to enter into the proposed arrangement?

A.

Contingent Fees

·n r
r
Circular 230 '§ 10.276 cpntains a genjlral rule b!IJTing unconscionable fees in
matters before the IRS. No guidance is provided on ;what unconscionability
means in this context; presumably, the principles in Model,Rule 1.5 would gov·
ern. Under Model Rule 1.5, factors consiqered in determining th!l reasonableness of a fee include:
1.
·
2.
·
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved; and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;.
the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the pruj;icular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
the fee customarily charged in the lpcality for similar legal services;
the ameunt,involved and the resu)ts olitaip.ed;
the time! limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
the nature and lehgth of.the professional retationship with the client;
the experience, reputatjon, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers perform·
'ing the services; and
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
'
1

I

I

"

t

t

.

.. .

6
Circular 230 § 10.27(b) permits practitioners to collect contingent fees in three specifiC Situations (which!U'~ discussed ijl the text). On Msrch 26, 2008, the IRS issued Notice-2008-43, 2008·15
I.R.B. 748, adding a foUrth situation in which contingent fees ate permitted and ahnouncing lts
intEmtio:b. tO amend certain language in Section.1.0.27(b). The· text asSNmes lhat•the changes
annol.Ulced in Notice 200843 have been incorporated into Circular 230. Students should make
sure to refer to Notice 2008-43 until such time as Circular 230 is formally amended.
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Model Rule 1.5(c) permits contingent fee arrangements- except in domestic
relations and criminal matters - so ltmg as they are documented in a writing
signed by the client and stating the method by which the fee will be calculated.
The AICPA prohibits contingent fee arrangements in connection with the
preparation of an original or amended tax return, or a claim for refund. AI CPA
ET Section 302 (together with AICPA interpretation 302-1, reproduced at
Appendix J). AI CPA Interpretation 302-1 provides several examples of circumstances in which contingent fees are permitted in connection with tax matters:
1. representing a client in an examination by a revenue agent of the client's
federal or state income tax return,
2. filing an amended federal or state income tax return claiming a tax refund
based on a tax issue that is either the subject of a test case (involving a
different taxpayer) or with respect to which the taxing authority is devel·
oping a position,
3. filing an amended federal or state income•tax return (or refund claim)
claiming a tax refund iD. an amount greater than the threijhold for'review
by the Joint Committee qn, Iqternal Revenue Taxation ($2 million) or
state taxing authority,
4. requesting a refund of either overpayments. of interest or penalties
charged, to a client's account or deposits oftlu<es improperly ,accoQ.Dted for
by the federal or state taxing authority in cireumstances where the taxing authority has established procedures for the substantive review of
_
. ,
such refund requests,
5. requesting, by means of "protest" or simiiar document, consideration by
the state or local taxing authority of a reduction in: the "assessed value"
of property under an ,established taxing authority review process for
hearing all taxpayer argoments relating to assessed value., and
6. representing a 'client in connection with obtaining a private letter ruling
or influencing the drafting of a regolation or statute.
Circular 230's goidance on the u'se of contingent fees in tax matters is similar,'but not' identical, to the AI CPA rules. A ~ontingent'fee is defined for Circular
230 purposes as:
any fee that is based, in whole or in part, on whether or not a position
taken on a' tax return or other filing avoids ch;.uenge 'by the Internal
Revenue Service or is sustained either by' the Internal Revenue Service
or· in litigation. A contingent fee inbludes a fee that is based' on a percentage of the refund reported on a return, that is based on a percentage ofthe,j;axes saved, or that otherwise depends on the specific,result
attained. A contingent fee also includes any fee arrangement in which
the practitioner will reimburse the client for all or a portion of the client's fee in the event that a position taken on a tax return or other
filing is challenged by the Internal Revenue Service or is not sustained,
whether pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a goarantee, rescission
rights, Qr any other arrangement with a similar effect.

Circular 230 § 10.27(f)(1). Contingent fees are prohibited' generi\IIY for services
rendered in ,connecl(~on wi.t)l. any matter before the IRS. Thus, practitioners
may not charge contingent' fees in aonnection with preparing or filing of an
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original tax return, amended tax r!lturn; or claim for refund. Re~tricting contingent fees in this context is thought: to discourage return positions that
exploit the "audit lottery." Circular 230· does permit ·contingent fee arrangements, however; in four specific' situations.
•.

first,'~ practitioner may ch!lrge a contingeQ.t tee for ser:'ices ren~~red in conorigfual tax return,
nectip,jl »'itli an IRS' examination of, or ci}allenge to,
a)llend'ed return, m: c!aini: for rlifund where the amended return or claim for
rilf{md i~. fil~d (1) per&~.~ the tllXIlarer receixes a written nofice of examin,ation
?f, or a, ~~n chall~~ge to, the original tax return or (2) no later th~ 1~0 days
after re~9;>t of su~h. written notice or Challenge. Contingent fees arE~,perJP.itteQ.
in 'this situation because unlike, e.g., an original return, substantive revi<,Jw hi
the IRS of the taxpayer's position here is a certainty. Therefore, the rule does not
encourage practitioners to encourage frivolous positions that exploit the audit
lotter.y. The 120-day limit addresses governmental concerns {)Ver the use of contingent fee arrangements in connectioa with claims for refund or amended
returns that are filed very late in the process of an examination (audit) in the
hope that an IRS officer or employee will not look' closely at the claims.

an

Secmid, a practitioner is permitted to charge ll contih$,ent ,fee for servic~~
ri'Jud\lTed in connectio!l with a claim for refund filed ~'?l!l!Y co~ei;tion, with,
the.determinatiqn of statutory interest or penalties (ISsessed l)y the IRS.
exception is meant to address services provided by'"account r~Jview practitioners" Viho retroactively evaluate :corporate taxpayers' JRS accounts, to qetermin~ whether' they have overpaid',interes~ or penaltieJ.!. Typ{cally,' ac~ount
review practitioners' fees are based on a percentag:e of tb~ savi!lgs' uncovered.
Because the inte~est. or penalties haye already b!l9n paid, a claim for, r¢.und is
necessary, assuring substantive revie_w by an IRS emplf?:yee or officer.

tn

'

This

'

Third, a •practitioner may··charge a• contingent fee•for services rendered in
connection with a whistlebldwer claim under Section 7623. 'llhat'section: establishes a program under which the IRS may pay rewards .to persorls who report
underpayments of tax by others. Such persons ("whistleblowers") may be entitled to receive a percentage of the taxes recovered by the'IRS.
Fourth, a practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with any judicial proceeding arising under the Code.
PROBLEM 3-22

Lawyer has been asked by Client for advice 'in connection with Client's
investment in a series of financial transactions, which Client hopes will result
ih substantial· tax savi!lgs t'o ~Iieut. Among the services to be provided by
Lawyer, Lawyer will issue an opinion letter describing the trui consequences of
the investment. May Lawy~r's fee reflect a portion of the projected tax savi!lgs?
Would it matter if Lawyer agreed to (perhaps retroactively) reduce her fee if
the tax savi!lgs did not hold up under audit or litigation?

B. Tax Return Accuracy Standards
Differences between the income tax return accuracy standards for taxpayers
and for the professiollals who advise them could result in conflicts of interest.
Specifically, with respect to the same position on a taxpayer's return, a tax

96

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

,

CH.3

adviser might face the imposition of a penalty if such position is not disclosed
(i.e., flagged) on the return while; at the same time, the taxpayer faces no p~n
alty risk for nondisclosure. In other words, it ;could be in the adviser's interest,
but not in the taxpayer/client's interest,, to ·disclose a position. Thankfully,
Congress significantly redy.ce~ th~ J?Oten.tia!- for ~uch confjic~s b;r ~ending
Section 6694 (the preparer penalty1-dies) in 2008 to confornt,the preparer and
taxpayer standard~. As is di~c~~~ed,!n Chap~r, '2, suP.[a,1~~~basic l!tahah.rd is
now "substantial authority" for both groups: return 'positions that 'are su,r.ported by substantiai authority generally Will not subject !\llY<lne i6 penalties;
positi6hs tHat iack substantial authority could subject both the't11xJ,>'ayer and
her professional. adviser to penalties unless the positions are disclosed· on 'the
return. See Sections 6694(a)(2), 66{!2'(d)(2)(B).
The professional standard articulated in ABA Formal Op. 85-352 differs from
the taxpayer standard. That difference creates the potential for conflicts of
interest. See ABA Section of Taxation Committee on Standards ofTax Practice,
Standards of Tax Practice-Statement 2000-1 (Dec. 4, 2000), http://www.abanet.
org/tax/groups/stp/stmt00-1.htinl. ABA. Formal Op. 85-352 concludes that "[a]
lawyer may advi~e ,r<:P.prting a position on !l tax return S<? long as the lawyer
believe~ in good fait'!fthat'the position is warranted in existing law or' can be
s~pported b~ li good faith ariument for an extension, modification or revers!il of
existing law and th~re is s'ome realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated" (the "realistic pos~ibllity of success" standh.r'd). 11. "realistic possibility of
success" ha's bee'n f!Ul!lltified as a likelihood of success approximating one-third.
Tfie reB.listic possibility of success standard also applies to CPAs, but' only where
the ap,P~cable taxjng '.'Vtho~ty has ?o written standards or if its stan~~ds 'are
lower than the AICPA standar,d~. See AI CPA SSTS No. 1 & In~rpretation No.
1-1, "Realistic Possibilfty Standard" (in Appendix C). The realistic possibility of
success standard· is inconsiste~t with Section 6694, as amended, and should be
revised or withdraWn.' tJntil revision; however, attorneys are strongly advised
to follow the higher standard in Section 6694.
'·

C. Referrals to OPR

The Internal· Revenue Manual lists circumstances in which a Revenue Agent
must or may refer a practitioner to OPR. Referral is mandatory in the following
situations:
1. when cases in which understatements due to unrealistic positions (Section
, p69,4(a)) are closed (shQuld.be "unreasonable pqsitions" in light of 2008
amendments);"
,. ,
2. when cas<:s in which.).mderstatel)1~ts due to ·willful or reckless conduct
(Section 6694(b)) are closed;

.,
7

No efforts to revise ABA Formal Op. 85-352 are underway as of the date of publication of this
text. The AICPA recently revised its SSTSs effective January 1, 2010. The new standard retains
the realistic possibility of success standard but requires CPAs to follow a higher standard if one is
adopted by the relevant taxing authority.J'herefore, ~JPAs are subject to the higher substantial
authority starldard in preParing federal teturns.
8 Although Di<~cto{s of OPR frtim timdto time have fn'dicated that referrals to OPR by Revenue
Agents would not be'" automatic m~the case~ of Section 6694(a) penalties, the Internal Revenue
Manual is clear in mandating referrals in these situations.
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3. when a penalty for negotiation of a refund' check (Section 6694(f)) is
assessed; t
•
,, ·
\•
4. when a penalty for aiding and abetting (Section 6701) is assessed (Revenue
Agents should consider referrals to OPR where the Section•6701 penalty
was considered but not imposed);.
5. when a penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters (Section 6700) is
assessed \lgain~t a,n.,atJ;orney, CPA or enrolled a&~nt
6. ,wl;l,en,an injunctive action (Section 7407 or Section 740/l) is t>fken agai;,st
promoters of a9usive tax shelters; lll).d
·
7. when· injunctive action (Section 7408) is taken against an attorney, CPA
or enrolled agent.

.

IRM 'II 4.11.55.4.2.2.1 (2005).
.

The following situations may warrant a referral t~ OPR:
'
' Investi!ll!tion
1. when return preparer referrals are made to the
IRS Crimb\.ill
1
Division (Section 7206);
'
· ·
2: when ~ appraiser who aids or assists in the preparation br presentatio~
of an appraisal in connection with the tax laws will be su'l:iject tO 'llisciplinary action if the appraiser knows that the appraisal will be used in
connection with the tax laws and will result in'an undetsfa1lment'ofthe
,, tax li,ability of anotl_ler Jlerson;
;•
3, whe11 a by-pass pfrepre.sentative letter was issued to,a tax practitioner;
' -4. wnen a practitioner enga'ges•in disreputable conduct or incompetence as
. described in Circular 230 § 10.51;
·5. -when a tax practitioner is implicated in a frivolous tax return matter
· (Section 6'702);
'''
·'
6. when art accu'racy-related penalty (Section 6662\d)) for a sub~tantial
understate,;, ant is asserted @d the !:'acts of the case suggest the pnicti'tionel' did not f~Xercise due diligence in the preparatioil' of the return; '
~- when a .Practitioner fails to co!"ply with. the tax shelter iegi~j;ration
requirement (Section 6111) 'or characterizes such registratio,\1 ~. fu\,1RS
endorsement of the shelter and takes a position on a tax return that
reflects the purported endQrsement~ '
8. when opinions ttmdered• by tax practitioners are used or referred to in the
marketi\lg of tax shelters (abusive or "Otherwise); and
'
9. when an examination report is written with respect to any tax return of
an attorney, CPA, or enrolled agent, or a return prepared by an attorney,
CPA or enrolled agent where a Pre-filing Notification Letter was issued
in connection with a tax shelter and the loss and/or credit from the promotion was nevertheless claiiD.ed on the tax return.'

IRM 'II 4.11.55.4.2.2.2 (2005).

'

PROBLEM 3-23
~~

'

I

Several years ago, Lawyer gave tax advice to a long-time client (Client). with
respect to an investment that Client was then considering. Client made the
investment, Client's income tax retum for the year in which the investment
wm; made is now under audit by the IRS. Because-Lawyer is Client's' regular
tax counsel, Lawyer is representing Client in the proceeding. From 'comments
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made by the IRS Revenue Agent during the course of discussions, Lawyer has
the impression that the Revenue Agent believes that Lawyer gave Client bad
advice at the. time,of the inv'lstment. ~at, if anything, should Lawyer do?
What, if anything, must Lawyer do1
PROBLEM 3·24

Lawyer represents Client during what Lawyer originally thought was a routine audit. During the course of the proceeding, Lawyer realizes that the
Revenue Agent may have grounds for referring her to OPR. Is there automati·
cally a conflict of interest? How' should Lawyer decide whether or not to with·
draw from the representation?

III. OPINION LETTERS AND WRITTEN ADVICE
Circular 230 §§ 10.22, 10.35, 10.36 and 10.37
Model Ruie 2:3·
AICPA SSTS No. 1 and Interpretation No. 1-2 (Appendix C and
Appel).di<' D)
•
A. Opinion Letters
Clients frequently ask their tax advisers for written opinion letters stating
the lawyers' or accountants' views on the tax treatment or consequences of
transactions ov investments described in the letters. The letters typically begin
with a detailed description of the transaction or investment with·respect to
which opinions,are rel).dered (these are the facts.on which the opinions are
based), continue with a statement of the relevant legal princip~es and authori·
ties and an analysis ofhow those principles and authorities j!.pply to the facts
at issue, and conclude by statmg opinions on tl;le tax treiltmpnt or consequences.
For a variety of reasqns, many of which are c4scusJ!ed in this section, ~pinion
letters usually contain a variety of embellishments, as well, e.g., the identity of
the person pr persons from whom the facts were obtained, the eXtent to which
on representations of others, etc.
an opinion
relies
'
,
Tax opinion letters can be useful in a variety of circumstances. Sometimes, a
client merejy seeks written comfort that her advisors have thought carefully
through the relevant issues and have. confidence in their advice. With the adop·
tion and implementation ofFASB FIN 48, 9 tax lawyers anticipate being asked

' Financial Accounting StandardsJloard (FASB) Interpretation (FIN) No. 48, "Accounting for
Uncertainty In Income Taxes." For tax years beginning after December 15, 2006 (with some
exceptions), FIN 48 governs the evaluation by CPAs of material positions taken in any income tax
return, for purposes of financial accounting. According to the FASB:
[FIN 48] clarifies the accormting for uncertainty in income taxes recognized in an enter·
prise's financial statements in accordance with FA{3B Statement No. 109, Accounting for
Income Taxes. This Interpretation prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement
Attribute fof the financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position
taken or expected to be taken in a tax return.

www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blob
The full text of FIN 48 is available through
links, on the FASB and AICPA websites.
where=ll758187oj6949&blobhead.e~;=application%2Fpd£
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for written opinions to influence auditors in creating tax accruals. Clients seek
opinion letters as a means of· defending against the possiblE! imposition of tax
penalties by the IRS; such opinion letters are easually referred to as ''penalty
protection." Some clients seek ~tax opinions iri order to influence others to
participate or invest in a transaction. Finally, same times opinions are required
by law. For ex,ample, federal s~curiti~s ,Jaws may ,requir!') ,that transact;ions
involVing issuance of securities to the publl~ iuclude an opinion to support
discussions of tax consequences included in the offering materials.
·'
Tax opinion letters prep.ict the likelihood of a, po~ition being_ sustained on its
merit~. if challenged by the I!tS. In other words, tJ:ey predict how a court would
rule if' c~lle~ ,upon to decid<t ihe issue or jssue~ opined upon, assum~g that tl).e
cou..,.t W,llre familiar'with all of tlte relev!!Jl~ facts. ln reality, the likeHl>ood of
lillY particular outcome is 4ifficult to quantify; nonetheless, cli~,nts as!> for, ~d
receive, greater or lesser degrees of assurance depending on the purpose ,or
context of the letter. Although there are neither formal definitions or'relevant
terminology nor any real agreement on the strength of the various levels, 'tax
opinion letters typically give assurance at one of five levels. 10
1. Reasonable basis has been quantified' by some to be as low as 5% and liy
others as high as the 20 to 25'lf! range. According to Tress. Reg. § 1.6662•3(b)(3):

. The nasonable basis stand,;;.? i~ 1,10~ sa~sfied by a return positi0\1 that
is merely arguable or that 1~ ine.rely a polorable claim. If a return
position is reas,onably,,based on 9;-,e more of the authprities s.et fprth
in the [substantial authprity regulations,] the ~etum position will
general}.:~; satlsi'y tJ,l,e ~easonable basis ~tanda~d even tho~g~ it may· not
satisf.y the substantial authority standard.

or

t

I

4

'

•

•

A position having a reasonable basis .avoids a negJigjjnce penalty. Tress. Reg.
§ 1.6662-S~b)(l). Moreover, a retlli'n poSition must have at least a reasonable
basis in order to avoid, through disclosure, 11 a penalty for substantial understatement of income tax ,or a preparer penalty under Section 6694(a).
Sections 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii), 6694(a)(2)(B).
·
·
'

'

,

2. Substantial authority'is difficult to quantii'y numerically but it certainly
may be less than 50%. "Substantial authority" is more stringeht than the
reasonable basis standard but less stringent than the more likely than not (i.e.,
greater than 50%) standard. Treas,Reg. §'1.6662-4(d)(2).
'
There is. ,substantial authority for the tax treatment of any jtem only.if
the weight of the authorities supporting th!' treatment is substantil:l\
in relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary treatm13nt.

10
The~e could be other standards for ~..pinions1 e.g., "not frivolous." The text addresses only the
standards that fire' most c.ommoD.ly utilized. For a tongp.e-in-cheek breakdown of tax opinion

standards, see A Detailed Guide'to ThX' Qpinu;n Staridar&, 106 TAX NoTEs 1~69-71 (2005).
11 'Form 8275 is attaChed to a return whenever a, ~p.yer or tax return preparer wishes to disclose items or positions in order to avoid certain penalties. Form'8275 is filed, for example, to avoid
the portions of the accuracy-related pen:ilty 'due to disr~gard of ;,mea to a substantial underStatement of income tax for nontax shelter iiemS 1f the returh Position has a reasonable 'basis. It
'•
(
can also be used for disclosures relating to preparer peDfl.lties for understatements due to umeason~ble positions or disregard of rules. (Where disclosure i~ ma'de of return- positions tha,t are
contrary to a regulation, Form 8275-R is used.)
I

o;

. ·-
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All,authorities relevant to the tax treatment of an item, including the
authorities contrary to the treatment, are. taken into account in determining whether substantial authority exists. '])he weight bf authorities
is determined in light of the pertinent facts. and circumstances in the
manner prescribed in [Treas. Reg.§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii)].
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i): (Students should p'e quite comfortable with thE\
meaning of "substantial authority" after hav'ihg studied Chapter 2 of this
text.)
.
.
. Because this standard can ~e satisfied at less than 50% certainty, it is possible· that there could be substantial authority•for more than one position.
Moreover, unlike any of the other levels of assurance, substantial authority is
not stated in the regulations in terms of how likelY a particular outcome wili b'e
but focuses instead on the strength, or relative strength, of the authority or
authorities supporting a position.
··
A position must have substantial authority in order to avoid the penalty for
substantial underststement of incpme tax without disclosure or a prepar!lr
penalty under Sections 6694(a). 12 Sections 6662(d)(2)(B)(i), 6694(a)(2)(A).

.

'

3. More likely than not means having a greater than 50% likelihpod of being
sustained on the merits. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B), 1.6694-2(b).().). 13
For fux years beginning afj;er Decl!n'tbe'r 15', 2006 (with some exceptions), "inore
likely than not" is the standard or threshold that lnust be used by CPAs in
assessing all material positions takel:i iii any htct>me tax return. 14 FIN 48
requires a company to'undertake and tetain a'detaiiM amilysiS' of tax positions
that may be uncertain and 'to document whether each' such position can be
recognized as more likely than not. While tax opihim:ls 'are itot required td meet
the FI:t;r 48 thr(lshold, companies routinely engage outside tax counsel or adv,isers to prepare tax opinions on significant po~itions to determine·whethers~:~ch
positions meet the "moJ;e likely than not" standard.
4. Should is not quantified or defined m'either the Code or the regulations,
but is generally considered to mean a likeliliood of success of more than 70%:
Thus, a ".should" QPinion,opines at.l\ level greater. than "more likely than not"
but less than ''will." Although some attorneys use the phrases·"weak should"
and "strong should" to describe the strength of their opinions, s-uch terminology
rarely is reflected in the opinion letters th_emselves. Because the level of"should"
is uncertain, these letters typically in~lude reasoning or analysis so that the
reader Cal\ asSess the degree of certainty or uncertainty 'for herself. (Not surprisingly, an o'phi.ion letter that includes a lengthy analysis is referred to as a
·
·
"reasoned opinion.").

12

In addition, substantial authOrity is requil;·ep.' in 6~de~ to qualify for the reasonable cause

exception to the penalty for reportable transactioh undeo,;latementa. Section6664(d)(2)(B).
13 A position m~st meet the more likely that not standar"d to avoid certain penalties related to
tax shelters ami rJportable tran'1,ilctions.Sectiona 6664(d)(3)(C), 6694(a)(2)(C).
'
14 The "mo;e likelY thah not" threshoid; for FIN 48 pui-poses means that: (1) a benefit related to
1
an p.nceltain t'ax position. maY D.ot De recognized in financial statements unless it is "more !flc.ely
than riOt" th~t tpe J?,OSition will be sustained based on its technical merits; and (2) there must be
nlore than a 50 percent likelihood that the position would be sustained if challenged and CO)lSidered b§' the highest court in the relevant jurisdiction.
·
'
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5. Will means 95 to 100%. A ~will" opinion is aonsidered a "clean" or "unqualified" opinion of near certainty. "Wil!"·opinions may be subject to -exceptions,
limitations, and/or assumptions, so long as they we cuStomary and are stated
in the
letter.
1
•J

B. Ethical Considerations
J
.,
1. Ethical Rules
In drj!ftiz;g an opinion, iaW)'e'r,s mu~Pbe mindfUl o{fhiditional ethlcaJ ~tan

dards. For e>;am~le, un<\er .IWA Fol'!llal Op. 85-352, a 1~wyer iS' prohibfted from
advising tall: return positibns that fall slih'rt of a "realistic possibility of succ\ess"
standard.'The ~~~nie stan'd!lrd is g'erteralli(t)J.ought to govern liny 1tax advice
given to a clie'nt't~'tne' ~xtent that tax ret~i.n positrons are w':lll he involved
(e.g.; adviili:dn nle l!outse of structuring transactions' that wlli i:livoive tax
return positions), ihcluding' tai advice ,in the codr~e qf prl!parin~ legal qocuments. Opilii.on 85-352 states:
'

or

[A] lawyer, in reprl)senting a client in the couxse of the preparation of
the client's tax return, may advise the statement of positions most
favorable to the client if the lawyer has a good faith belief that those
positions are warranted in eXisting law or cart be suppprted by a good
faith lp"gument for an extension, modification or revllrsai of. existing
law. A lawyer can have a good fa'ith belief ill tll.!s c.onttlxt even 'if the
lawyer believes the client's position probably will not prevail. However;
good faith requires that there be some realistic possibility of success if
the 'matter is litigated.
,
·
'

***

l

Thus, whl!~e ~lawyer has a gb6d faith belief in the validity of a position
in accordance with the standard stated above that a particular transaction does not result· in taxable income or that certain expenditures
are properly deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty to require
as ··a condition of his or• her continue,d ,representation that ridars be
attached to the client's tax-return· explaining the circumstances surrounding the tronsaction or the. expenditur.es.
In the role of advisor, the lawyeNfuotll.d counsel the client as to whether
the position is likely to be sustained by a·cohl-t if challenged by'the IRS;
'aS well as of the potential penalty consequences to the clielit if the' posi-.
tiob. is taken on the tax return without disclosure. Section 6661 [now
Section 6662]'ofthe Internal. Revenue Code imposes a penalty for substantial understatement 'of tax liability which can be avoid'"ed if the •'
facts are adequately disclosed or ir'the~e is or'was Substantial authority for the position taken by the taxpayer. Competent representation of
the client would require the lawyer to advise the client fully as to
whether th!;lre is o~ was ~upstantial authori\')',fp,r the p_qsition t~njn
the tax-return. If. the lawyer is un,a)lle.to conclude 1>l;lat the nosition i~
supported by-substantial authority, the lawyer should advise the client
of the penalty the client may suffer and of the opportunity to avoid
such penalty by adequately disclosing the facts in the return or in a
statement' attached to the retui:-ii. 'If ~ .receivip.g such advice the
client decides to risk.the p~alty by makil).g no disclosll!e and to take
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the position initially advised by the lawyer in accordance witli the
., standard stated above,. the lawyer has met his or her ethical resP"onsibility with respect ·to the advice.
In all cases, however, with regard both to the preparation of r~to~s ·
and negotiating administrative settlements, the lawyer is under a duty
not to mislead the Internal Revenue Service deliberately, either by misstatements or by silence or by permitting the client to ~Slf!ad.
In sp1pmary, a lawyer m(ly ~dvise,repo,rting ~position on a retorn even
where the lawyer ,believes tJ::e position :r;wbbaP,ly will not ,prevail, there
is no 'substantial authoritY. in 'support ,of the position, and there will
be no ~li.sclosur!" of the 'i:>osih\l.p. in tq17 ~eturn. 'However1 th~ position to
~e asserted must be one which the lawyer in !fOOd faith b!"lieves is warrantedin existing lJlW or clffi be suppo~il by a goo,d {aith.argumElnt for
an extension, modifica.tipn or reversal of existing law. This requires that
there is some realistic possibility of success if t{Je IJtatter is li~igated. In
addition, in his role as advisor, the lawyer should refer to potential
penalties and other. legal eonseqnences should the client take the poSition advised.

The r,ealistic possibility of succe~s 'standard has b.e~n quantifieq as a one in
three, or greater,, like\ihood of being sustained on the merits. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-2(b}(l)' (as iD; eff"l't pn.pr to J;!ec'.' 15, 20Q8); !Jircular 230 § 10.34(d)(l)
(as in effect prior tO Apr. 1. 2008). Prior to '2008, Circular 230 mandpted the
same reajisti,c possibility of s.uccess stand11rd w'i.th respect to tax retuJ1l. positions, and the preparer penalty rule under Section 6694(a) incorvorated ,that
standard, as well. The AlCPA rule was the same. Thus, all tax professionals
were governed by the same reporting standards in all contexts. (The tax
professional was governe~ by a different r,jlP.Prting standard than her client,
however- reali~tic possi~ility of success ver'shs substantial au~hority. 15 )

1

1

I

In 20081 Section 6694(a) was amended to require that, with respect to tax
advice, 31 teturn prepater must meet the substantial authority standard (as
described in 0hapter 2). The· realistic possibility of success standard. was
removed from Circular 230 § 10.34(a) because it was inconsistent with the
statotory amendments.'• Therefore, while. the tax practition'er'a statutory
reporting (i.e., penalty) st~darq no)V CO,!Iforms,to·her,client's (i.e., both are now
sub~tantial authm:ity), the attorneys ethical standard is now inconsistent with
both, and Circular 230ds silent on the 1\1'/-tter.jo.sPfthis.~ti!lg, ABA Formal
Op. 81;i-352 has ;not been revipedc to reflect the,incongruities !'Ild no efforts to
make, the appropriate revisipns are underw:}y. The etJ:Vcal standard set,fo).'th in
Opinion 85-352, therefore, ll\USt be, revised to conform the ethical st!'Ildard to
Section 6694(a), or v,rithdr.awn. ,

Ethical iBsues arisini out of this cOnflict wer~ k.ddr"essed by' the ABA s>'ection of Taxation
Committbe·oit Standards ofTaxPraCtice in ItS standards ofTax Practice Statement 2001-1 (Dec. 4,
15

2000),. http://vrnhv.abanet.org/taxlgroups/stp/sttittOO-l.html. Specifically, this•,Statement explores
whether the )Jenefits of 1\d,equately disclosing return positions, which might have affected taxpayers and adv.jsersfllil'erently, generated conflicts of interest.
,
r
••
•
" A. of the date of publicatio;, of this text, the substantial authority stan11ard has 'not been added
ro Circular230. \Vhile the Direcror ofdPRhisindicated that an amendment ro Circular230 § 10.34(a)
will be proposed shortly, it is not Clear that the forthcoming standard will mirror'Siction 6694(a).
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' Opinion letters that may be used or relied upon by 'third parties (other thanthe client), e.g., prospective' investors in.a transaction organized and promoted
by a client, must comport with Model Rule 2~3, under which (1),the rendering
lawyer must reasonably believe that making an' evalUlition for the benefit of
third 1/arties is compaV:b.Je wjth other.aspeqts of the lawyer's rejaj;ionship with
tp.e client Wtil (2) if the jaw:v.~,;,Jmovy.;; or rEl'l-sonably 'sh'l.ltlfJ,'lmow th,at the
evljl,ua~on is Jjkely to affest,t;h(l elien t's jnterests materially and, advewily, the,
lawyer may not provide the evaluation unless the client gives Informed consent. According to the Qpm~ents to Model Rule 2,3, when, ,a question about the
legal situation of a clien.t arises at the instancE!\ of the ·~lien,t's financi.al auditor,
t]>e lawyer's response may be made in accordance 'Yit4. P,rucedures.recognized
in the legal profession, such as the so-called "treaty'' enw~ed into ,betweep. the
ABA and AICPA. See ABA Corum. on Audit Inquiry Re~pQI}Slls, Stateme'!t of
Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 31
•
\
Bus. LAw. 1709 (1975)."
1

2. 'AICPA Standards
,

,.

.
, ,

,

1

r

According to the AICPA SSTSs and interpretations (Appendix C), the same
standard that applies to. tax return preparation applies to professional servi'ces
involving~ax planning. Interpretation No. 1-2 to SSTS No.1 (Appendix.D). Tax
planning; for this purpose, includes an'y oral or •written recommendation or
exp~ession of an opinion in a pr0spective or completed transaction on·either a
return position or on a specific trutplan by the member, the taxpayer or a third
party.'Interpretation·No. 1-2 provides guidelines fi:>r issuing opinions and for
reviewing opinions given to the client bY' other tax professionals.
Under the AI CPA standard,."[aj member should not recoll).mend that a tax
return [or tax planriing] position be taken with respect to any item unless the
membet has a good faith bel~ef that th'e position has a realistic possibility of
being ~ilstained administratively or judicially on its merits if cliallenged."
The AICPA recently revised this standard, 'which was at odds with both
Circular 230 and Section '6694(a). The nllw standard retains' the real~slic possibility of success standard in situations where the applicable taxing autliority has no written standards'or where such written standards are lower than
the AI CPA's standards; otherwise, members would b(j required to comply with
standards imposed by such an authority. Thus, in the case of a federal tax
return, the preparer penalty standard in Section 6694 (i.e., substantial
authority) would govern.

C. Ci,rcular 23p
In.2004, Treasury issued final regulations prescribing opinion standards
and rules that were aimed primarily at opinions rendered in tax shelter-transactions: .The regulations, however, cover other written 'Opinions, as welL Please
review Circular 230 §§ 10.3,5, 10.36, and 10.37. Circular 230 § 10.35 provides
standards and rules applicable when rendering a "covered.opinion." Circular
230 § 10.37 provides standards and rules that apply when Circular 230 § 10.35
17 The treaty is currently Wlder revision in light of statutory and other changes, including FIN
48. The ABA's position paper on• responding to auditor responses in light of FIN 48 is available at
http1/meetings.abanet.org/webuploadlconunupload!CL965000/otherlinks_files/fin48statement.pdf.
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does not. Thus, the first hurdle to overcome is. whether any particular wrttten
advice is or will be considered a "covered opinion." Although the definition of a
"covered opinion" is elaborate, the standards and rules that apply to "covered
, ·
opinions" are straightforward.
'

As a prelimin~ matter, Circular 230 § 10.35 applies only to "written advice,"
including electronic communications. dr'at advice is not 'affected. The inclusion
of electronic communications means that ~~Jlatively innocuous e-mails covering
tax topics may constitu~e "written advice: withln the regulations. If they do,
then the requirements Of Cil'cular 230 '§ 1().35 apply unless the e-mail explicitly disclaims
that its col:ltents
may be relied upon by thti recipient for 'certain
•
t
,
purposes. See, e.g., Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(5)(iii). This explains the ubiquitous
Circular 230 disclaimers 'that are now prominent at the end of ~-mails sent
from many law and a~counting firms. 18
'<

~

1. Covered Opinions
A "covered opinion" is written advice (including electJo,nic communications)
concerns one or more federal tax issues arising from of the following:

th~t

1. A transaction that is the same as or substMtially similar to 'a "listed
transaction." These are transactions that the IRS identifies as tax avoid·
ance transactions, typically in a Notice. (The IRS web site contai!)s a listing of listed transactions, e.g., "Recognized Abusive and Listed
Transactions - LMSB Tier I Issues in Alphabetical Order," http://www.
irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/O,id=204155,00.html,)
Listed
transactions are a type of rei!Qrtable transaction, participation in which
must be disclosed in an investor's tax return. Tr!las. Reg. § 1.6011-4.
2. An entity, plan or arrangement, the principal purpose of which is federal
tax avoidanc!l or evasion. The fact that "principal purpose" is pot defined
is a source of frustration to practitioners. But see·Treas. Reg.§ 1.6662-4(g)
(ii), which d,efines "principal purpose" in the context of the substantial
understatement penalty as it applies to tax shelters.
3. An entity, plan or arrangement, a significa)lt purpose of which is federal
tax avoidance or evasion, but only if the written advice is:

,..a.

a teliance' opinion,

b. a marketed opinion,
c. subject to conditions of confidentiality, or
d. subject to contractual protection.
These four subcategories, (a)-( d), are expounded upon in Circular 230 § 10.35.
In practice, it may be difficult to conclude that a transaction does not have a
significant purpose where tax consequences were considered in making struc•
turing decisions. Therefore, many tax practitioners rely on falling outside of
the four subcategories to avoid having to comply with the Circular 1!30
§ 10.35(c) rules, or include in their written advice or opinion letters the disclaimer language discussed below.

18

An example: qAny statements regarding federal tax law contained herein are not intended•or

written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purposes of avoiding penalties that may be imposed
under federal tax law or to market any entity, investment plan or arrangement."
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'A "covered opinion" do1!s not include preliminafy·Wl'itten advice .if a practitioner reasonably expects to provide the client with more extensive written
advice later in the tepresentation. Moreover, ·written. advice that woitld 'be a
"covered opinion" undet the significant purpose category is not considered a
"covered 'opinion" if the advice (1) concerns the qualification 6f a qualified plan,
(2).is a state or local bond opinion, 19 or (3) is inHudeil in documents required to
be filed with the SEC. (Qu~ry whether documents that are typically filed with
the SEC, but which are riot explicitly 'required ·to be" filed, •are "covered
opinions.'~)
'.

''a. Signifimi.nt Pur}>ose,Trall~~~t~ons

,.

Of the three eategories of written advice that can be covered. opinions, 11he
third, the significant purpose transaction, poses the most•is&ues for practitioners because these transactions are not necessarily overtly tax-motivated and
because practitioners mu~t determine which of tl,\,e four .subcategorjes, if any,
within the significant purpose category the written 'advice falls into. The in0st
significant !\Ild potentiall:)" trdubling of the l'oili, is the "refiance opinion," which
is the'type'of opinion that clients use or attempt to us~ to defend against imposition of penalties; hence, reli'aiJ.ce opiniops conclude at a confid,ence 1pvel of at
least more likely than not that one or more significant federall'ax issues wouid
be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The regulation permit's c~ients and tax
advisers to opt out of Circ!llar 230 § 10.':36 .by rwominently ilis~losing in the
written 'advice that it was not intended or Written by the practitioner to be
used, and that it 'cann9t be used, for the purpose of avoiding penalties. 'Thus,
the tax'payer cannot use 'the opinion letter to 'establish the rllasonable cause
and good faith defense to the accuracy-related penalty. See Section 6664(c);
Treas. Reg. §• 1.6664-4.
Wri~n advice constitutes a' mi;U'keted opinion if the practitioner knows or
has reason to know that the Written advice will be used or referred to by persari other than the practiti~ner or her firm in prbmoting, marketing, or reconimendini llJ! entity, invesimeht plan, or arr!illgement. A disclaJ.mer c'an tiike the
written advice out of the categor:~> While the drafters of the regulation prob~bfy
HM in mind mafl<e~d tax she\£et opinions, the'regulatory language is broad
enough ro ap~ly to private 'offerings in the capital illarkets \m which filing with
the SEC is not required). Such trlinsactions probably meet tlie "significant purpose" test where,the investments. themselves offer tax advantages.J<'or example, preferred stock bears a lower tax cost than straight debt because dividends
are taxed at capital gains rates. See Section 1(h). For foreigners, straight debt
often 0ffers tax advantages because, e.g., the interest might be exempt under
the portfolio interest rules. See Section 871(h).

a

The remaining two categories1pose fewer issues for practitioners.

b. ;Requirements for Covered Opinions

' " in
Circular 230 § 10.35(c) sets forth specific requirements that must be met
giving a covered o~inion. WJrile most good practitioners have, in the past,

,,
19

State and local bond opinions are addressed separately in Circular 230.
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follpwed similar practices to those. in the· regulation in rendering tax opinions, the. regulation exceeds prior practice in several significant ways. First,
the rt)quirements apply.. to what practitioners might othet>Vise think of. as
casual advice, e.g.., e-mails<·Under Circular 230 § 10.35, jf an e-mail constitutes a covered opinion, th~ all of the re.quirements must be followed. S<)cond,
the regulations. require• that.,tlw. practitioner's &nalysis be set forth in the
opinion. itself. In the past, opinions might have cout.ained a detailed analysis
(a "long-form opinion") Qr might have simply stated the practitioner's opinions and conclusions (a "short-form opinion'). In some cases, analysis underlying sho~t-form opinions was provided separately to clients and/or maintained
in the practitioner's file. (A ~hort-for':l OJ:!in~on was the basis f?r OPR's unsuccessful disciplinary proceeding in the Sykes case di~cussed in Chapter 1.)
Third, tlre regulation requires that certain information be set forth in separate sections, as preseribed, rather than in a format selected by the rendering
practitioner. • .
·
'
The r~giilation. requires that c,onch.lsions be stated with respect to each significljllt fe?eral tax issue consisfered in the opip.ion. In the past, pract~~ioners
might have rendered opinion~ on some, but not a11, t'ax issues. Perhaps clients'
motives were nefartous fiu~. in man.Y casesl clients asked for opinions only on
issues wwclJ. tl'ify,an,ticfpateq.the I~?, wq!tid be likely to examine. Under th<:
current rules,.pr'}ctttioners may provide. 81?- opinion tha't considers l!'JSS than all
oftl:J,e significant'federal tax issues only if (l) the practitioner and client agree
that the client may rely on th~ opillion for penalty protection only with re§pect
to ~sues addr~ssed in the opiniqn, (2) the opinion dO(\S not pertain to a listed
transaction or a principal purpose transaction: anQ. (3) the opinion includes
'
'
certain required disclosures.
Students should review the requirements of Circular 230 § 10.'35(c) at this
time. An opinion that meets the requirements of Circular 23Q § 10.35 satisfies
the practitioner's. responsibilities under that sectfon. However, the persuasive,
ness oftp.e opW~n and th~ tllt'payer'~ good faith reliance on th\) opinion will b~
determined separately shovld. the need arise CllAl',1 if tl,le; taxpayer uses the
opinion to satisfy ,the reasonaq!e cause and goo~ f~tl,l exception to the acquracy:related periruty). In brp_ad stroke, Circ)lfa:r; 230 § 10.3&,(~) mandates, tha~
practitioners consid~r all relevant facts, relate the law to the facts, ev~uate the
significant federal tax issues, and provide a conclusion.
'
I

,

I

•

1. Factual matters. The practitioner must make reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts and is prohibited from basing her opinion on unreasonable factual assumptions or representatibns.'The opinion must contain a
section identifying all relevant facts, all factual assumptions, and all representations, statements, or findings of the taxpayer relied on in. the opinion.
2. Relate law to facts. ['he opinion must relate the applicable law to the relevant facts. The practitioner may not assume a favorable conclusion with
respect to any significant fed~ral tax is~ue or ot_hepv{s~ b!'5<j. an ppinion on
unreasonable assumptions or representations. The opllllon may not contain
any internally inuonsistent legal analyses or conclusions.
··
3. Evaluation of significant federal tax issues. The opinion must consider all
significant federal tax issues and provide conclusions as to the likelihood that
the taxpayer will prevail on the merits of each. The opinion must provide a

III.
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conclusion, and indicate'the confidence level•ofthe conclusion, as to each of the
issues and explain and•describe the reasons for all conclusions. A covered opinion that fails to .conclude at a confidence level of at reast more likely than not
that a significant federal tax issue would be sustained on its merits if challeqged must prop1ine~tly disclose that the o11inion does not re~cljl. that confidence. level and that the' taxpayer may not use tl!e opll)i,on ,to avoid penalties.
Moreover, none of the following possibjlities may be ,taken into account in eval1,1atin~ the taxpayer's chances of sw,cess qn the merits: tha~,a tax re~urn will not
be audited, that an, is!jue, will not be pii.se~ on audit, or t\l;lt an issu'e wil)., be
resolved tlirough settl~ent if raised.
1 ,_. ..

.

• 4. Overall eonclusion. A covered opinion must state an overall conclusion or
· '
explain why an overall conclusion could not be reached. '
In ;rendering anppinion, a practitioner is pel'IIlitte,d to r!JlY on the. opinion m;
opinions of another practitioner with respect to one or more significant federal
tax issues unless the practitioner knows or should know that the opinion or
opinions of the other practitioner' shoUld not be relied. upon. If a practitioner
relies on the op~on.of anothe,rrpractitioner,.however, the,relyiug pra~titioqer's
opinion must identify the other opipion.and ~et forth,th,e CQP.~lllsions·J:eache4
in that t>thi'Jr ORinion.
,
r
I

· 2. Best Practices
Circular 230 § 10.36 requires that individuals rendering w,ritten advice and
1
'I
(
'
their firms •ake reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate proceilures.for co,mpl~g ¥th Cifcular ~3q § 10.'35. Failure to .mp.il\.tain adeguate
procedures could result in discipline \lnder Circular 230 as to both the firm and
the individual. While the IRS h~s not ruled on the matter, it wouid se~~ that
the traditiom!I prac'tice of req~ring approval by at least tWo partners beffire
rendering a formal t.rt opinidh (the so-called "two partner rule") would constitute a reasonable practice.
'· •

3. Other Written Advice
Written advice that does not constitute a "covered opinion" must be rendered in accordance with the. rule~ ~n .Circular 230 § 10.37, which are less
detailed than those in Circular 230 § 10.35. The rules in Circular 230 § 10.37
are essehtihlly J>rocedutal; prllctltioners ate permitted to give Written allvi'ce
regardless de whether the practitioner concludes that' any particuiar 1l!sue will
be re.solved in favor of the taxpayer W1d regardless of the confidence level the
practitioner has with resp,ect to an}\ particular issue's resol'!)ion.'It seems clear
under general ethical principles, however, that a :practiti'qner's reservations
abo~t the strengtli her advice shoul!l be communiJat6d. tO th{client. · ·
I

t

I

0

Und13r Cir~ulrq: ~30 § 10.37, a practitioner is prohibi¥ld from giving written
advice ~nly under four circumstances:
. L the practitioner bases the written advice on unreallOnable factual or legal
· · assumptions, including assumptions as to futu~e-events;
2. the practitioner unreasonably relies on representations, statements, findings or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person;
I
3. tlie practitioner does not consider all relevant facts that the practitioner
'
know or should know; or

l

,
108

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNiNG AND ADVICE

CH.3

4. in evaluating a federal tax issue, the tax practitioner takes into account
the possibility that a tax retum will not be audited, that an issue will not
be raised on ·audit, or that an issue will be resolved through settlement if
raised.

..

In evaluating-whether a practitiorier has failed to comply with Circulk ll30

§ 10.37, all facts and circumstances'wil~ be considered. A heightened standard

of'<\are is expected of a practitioner who' gives written advice that she knows or
has reason to know' will' be itsed or referred to by a person other than the practitioner in promoting, marketing or recommending to othets an entity, plan or
arrangement with a significant tax avoidance or evasidn purpose. Thls is written advice•that satisfies the first part of the definition of"marketed opinion" in
Circular 230 § 10.35 but which otherwise does not quality as a "covered opinion." Thus, the heightened standard applies to written advice that otherwise
loo~ lik? a marketed opiniort but w~ch cont_ains the required disclaimer~.

'
J'ROBLEI\J
3-25
'
Are the•following "covered opinions"? If so, what advice would you give to the
practitioners' about the preparation and content of the advice? in the alternative, how can the practitioners in each case alter the advice ·to avoid 'the "covered opinion" rules? If the "covered opinion" rules do not apply, what standards
should the advice meet?
. '
'

a. A .corporate lirwyer receives the following question by e-mail from a longthp.e cliimt': "I'm buying'a machine for $10,000. I'm paying $1,000 cash and
fin'anclng the res.!. I'U get to take depreciation deductions froin a $10,000
basis, right?"
. Tbe corporate lawyer iesponds~"Yes." ·
b. In discussipg with .her client whether to acc\)pt a settlement in a. tort suit
involving personal physical injury, a trial lawyer reminds her client (in
writing) that "the settlement won't be taxable to you."
c. In (a) and (b) above, would it matter if the advice were given orally? Why
· orwhynot?
·
· ·'
•
'
"

.

PROBLEM 3-26
,a,,Practi~9ner adVised clieQ.t priQl' to tb,y, copune11cement of negotiations for a
trai}~action. AlteTI,'atiye stT"?,ctures '!"ere discussed and diifer\)nt assumptioQ.B were made regarding future circumstances ,as a means of determin·
!Jlg, the stralo!l.!n,' ,f,<;>r negotiations; After tp.e transaction is completed, the
taxpayer G]le~)t~ with the practil(ioner"bY.,.e;\fiail, tp confirm the tax b;eatment of a. pahi.c~ar item associated with the transaction. Is the practitioner's reply, if in writing, subject to the covered opinion rules?
b.' 'Suppose that'~everal years later, the client is notified that the IRS intends
to examine its return for the year in which the transaction occurrea. Tbe
practitioner· advises the client in writing' about the. possible-likelihood or
grounds for an •IRS• challenge, and discusses the p'ossible range of settlement outcomes under yarious dispute resolution alternativ,es, speculating
or opining on, the likely outcomes under each alternat~ye. Does the !fiscus·
sion ~onstitute a "covered opinion" or "other written advice"? How can the
practitioner answer if the client asks'whether .she had a reasonable basis
for any of the positions?
l

I,·

I

'

I

'A

'

•

I
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PROBLEM 3-27'

Do the following e-mail communications constittite covered opinions?. Why
·
··
"-

~r why not?

·~ '

a .. Lawyer has• advised Client, a group of .investors, regarding an-acqu,isition
•' of Target, an,_;S «OJ;pomtion organized in Delaware. Client has formed
Purchaser, a Delaware corporation, to make the purchase. The purchase is
intendeq to be a "qualified.stock purchase" with respect to which a Section
338 election will be made. Client sends an e-mail to Lawyer: ~'Lawyer
The largest shareholder in Target would like the opportunity·(but not the
obligation) to invest in Purchaser at some point after Purchaser acquires
Target. Will that have any effect on the basis step-up that we are expecting?" Lawyer responds: "AI!t long as he isn't obligated to reinvest, I believe
that should be ok, although the answer isn't entirely clear-cut."
b. Client, a U.S. citizen, is an employee of an Italian corporatioh the stock of
which iS traded on 'the New York Stock Exchange. Client e-mails LaWy'er:
"My employer is offering me the opportunity to purchase stock. However,
they are reqniring that I contractually agree not to sell the stock for three
years. Will I still be entitled to a 15 percent rate on the dividends ifl agree to
that?" Lawyer: "Yes, I believe that you will still be entitled to the 15 percent
rate. To get that rate, the stock must be 'readily tradable' on a U.S. exchange.
But, I believe that that requirement applies based on the class of stock
that you own, such that individual contractual arrangements with respect
to the stock don't matter."
c. Lawyer has been advising Client regarding a divisive tax-free reorganization of one of its businesses. Client's in-house tax counsel sends Lawyer
the following e-mail: "Lawyer - I know you said that Parent needs to use
100% of the cash it receives from Subsidiary in the reorganization to pay
down third-party debt of Parent under Section 361(b)(3). Parent plans to
invest the $1 million it receives from Subsidiary in certificates of deposit,
then six months later, pay $1 million to third-party creditors of Parent, but
Parent will keep the interest it earns on the $1 million through the
certificate of deposit. Ok?" Lawyer responds: "Your proposal probably
works. We should talk."
d. Lawyer has been advising Acquiror regarding the negotiation ofAcquiror's
merger with Target throughout the past three months. The merger is
intended to qualify as a reorganization of Target into Acquiror under
Section 368(a)(1)(A). Shortly before the merger agreement is to be signed,
Acquiror sends an e-mail to Lawyer that states: "Lawyer- Target is skeptical when we say that our proposed consideration of 60% stock/40% cash
will satisfy the continuity of interest requirement. Could you confirm that
this consideration mix will not pose a continuity problem? I would like to
forward your e-mail to Target's CEO." Lawyer quickly responds by email:
'~s we have discussed many times, the consideration mix will satisfy the
continuity of interest requirement."
e. Lawyer has advised Client, a Delaware corporation, for years regarding corporate transactions. Client sends Lawyer the following e-mail:
"Lawyer - Quick question, if we own stock in a corporation and a large
number of options to purchase stock in that corporation, and the corporation
redeems all of our stock (but we still hold the options), is it possible that

...
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we would receive dividend treatment on the redemption (qualifYing for the
dividends received deduc~on)?" Lawyer ,responds by e-mail: "Obviously I
need more facts to reach a firm conclusion, but generally, when a person
owns an option to purchase stock, the tax law treats the person as owning
the stock for purposes of testing a redemption. So, in a situation where you
owned 'enough options, you would qualify for dividend treatment (and the
dividends received deduction) when the corporation 'redeems your stock.
However, there would be collateral consequences, including possible gain
recognition under the extraordinary dividend rules of Section 1059, which
we need to discuss."

·'
PROBLEM 3-28

Taxpayer intends to issue a debt instrument that has a variety of equity
charact_eristics. Taxpayer requests that Lawyer provide a formal written opinion that Section 163(1) should not prevent deductibility of interest on the instrument. Lawyer is willing to deliver such opinion. Can she?

